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WHERE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
BIOLOGY MEET: OF PANDAS' THUMBS,
STATUTORY SLEEPERS, AND EFFECTIVE LAW
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.
"He who understands [the] baboon would do more towards metaphysics than
Locke."l
"If the human species is not the result of divine creation, then we are the result
of a real proces "Q
"We are not just rather like animals4 we are animals"3
"Philosophers who have examined the foundations of society, Rousseau said,
have all felt the need to return to the state of nature, but none of them ever
got there A
'And what have you learned of the Creator from your lifelong study of evo-
lutionary processes?"
"He must have an inordinate fondness for beetle&"5
"Descended from monkeys?... My dear, let us hope that it isn't true! But
if it is, let us hope that it doesn't become widey known!"
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, School of Law. This article is dedicated to Marg-
aret Gruter, founder of the Gruter Institute of Law and Behavioral Research. Special acknowledgement
is due to the Gruter Institute fellows who include Robert Trivers, Lionel Tiger, Robert Frank, E.
Donald Elliot, Robert Cooter, Gorden Getty, Michael McGuire, Roger Masters, Jack Hirshliefer, Frans
de Waal, and Wolfgang Fikentscher. They have influenced my thinking greatly, although I am stuck
with the responsibility for the final product. The "panda's thumb" metaphor is developed in E.
Donald Elliot, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. R. 306 (1986).
1. GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE: ON THE MATTER OF THE MIND 49
(1992) (an excerpt from Darwin's notebooks).
2. LIONEL TIGER, THE PURSUIT OF PLEASURE 52 (1992).
3. MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN: THE ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE xiii (1978).
4. MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 75 (1972).
5. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE MACHINERY OF NATURE: THE LIVING WORLD AROUND US-AND How IT
WORKS 208 (1986) (quoting English biologist John B.S. Haldane).
6. DAVID P. BARASH, THE HARE AND THE TORTOISE: CULTURE, BIOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 7
(1986) (quoting the spouse of the Bishop of Worcester, responding to the findings of Darwin).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of legal theory presumes or constructs a version of the "human being"
or "human nature" that is the subject of legal influence. John Rawls offers us a
thoughtful soul who emerges from behind a "veil of ignorance" as if from the hand
of God.7 For a number of years, Richard Posner has been improving upon a ver-
sion of the flinty-eyed economic man,8 while Bruce Ackerman describes an isolated
and terminally rational person who is struggling for autonomy in a hostile world.9
There are other strong contenders in this "human nature" legal tournament-the
beautifully crafted icons of moral choice known to the law and literature move-
ment, 10 the schizophrenic souls of the critical legal studies world who are smitten
by a "fundamental contradiction" between service to self and relationship to oth-
ers, 11 and the good citizens of the Republican government movement who go to
the polls in foul weather and fair, and in times turbulent and placid.12 In recent
years, Robin West has come forward with a description of the mythical figure of
feminine jurisprudence, 13 and she is a profoundly different character from the one
who has been polluting the streams, driving sharp bargains, and seeking revenge
across the fabric of common law.
It is time, perhaps, to supplement this impressive legal list of human natures
with a description of Homo sapiens sapiens as it is known in evolutionary biology.14
7. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) with id (3d ed. 1986).
9. BRUCE A. ACKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE UBERAL STATE (1980).
10. See, e~g., Kenneth L Karst, The Interpreters, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1655 (1990) (book review); Sympo-
sium, Lqal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L REv. 2073 (1989Y Richard A. Weisberg, Entering With a Vengeance.
Poner on Law and Literature, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1597 (1989) (book review).
11. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blacstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209 (1979).
12. See Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Symposium, The New
Pmblic Law, 89 MICH. L REy. 707 (1991).
13. Robin WestJmrisprudena and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
14. Technically, "Man the wise, the wise," a subspecies distinguished from Homo sapiens neandertha-
l/s, "Man the wise, the neanderthal." See RICHARD MILNER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVOLUTION: HUMAN.
ITY'S SEARCH FOR ITS ORIGINS 218-19 (1990); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY 267-
74 (Ian Tattersall et al. eds., 1988). See general/y ROGER LEWIN, IN THE AGE OF MANKIND: A SMmriSONIAN
BOOK OF HUMAN EVOLUTION (1988), D.T. RAsMussEN, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF HUMANS AND
HUMANNESS (1993); THE FIRST HuMANs: HUMAN ORIGINS AND HismORY TO 10,000 B.C. (Goran Burenhult
ed., 1993).
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This character is but one of 258 species of living primates, and it shares a common
ancestry with all of these, not to mention a number of others now extinct. The
baboon that Darwin invokes separated from the line that led to modern humans
some thirty million years ago ("mya"), i5 the orangutan diverged 17.3 to 14.0 mya, 16
the gorillas branched off some 5.9 to 9.0 mya, 17 and our closest relatives, the
chimps and bonobos, both endangered species, went their separate ways perhaps 6.4
to 4.9 mya.18 Ninety-nine percent of the genetic material found in contemporary
humans also is found in the chimps, 19 which means we share a degree of genetic
relatedness comparable to that distinguishing the zebra from the donkey.20 Zebras
and donkeys can interbreed to produce sterile offspring, and the same is probably
true of matings between humans and chimps or humans and bonobos,21 although
nobody has reported on the experiment.
The purpose of this article is to introduce some of the recent findings of evo-
lutionary biology to the legal community and to urge their consideration in devel-
oping a more effective law. As background, Part II of this article will present a brief
evolutionary history of our own species. Part III offers a primer on Darwin's the-
ory of natural selection and the concept of adaptation, with special attention to
the elaboration of altruism as it is known in modern biology. Part IV discusses
maladaptation as a counterpoise to adaptation and underscores the notion with
some stories from natural history on subjects such as pandas' thumbs, cats' tails,
and bats' wings. All of these forms of maladaptation have their metaphorical coun-
terparts in law. Part V directly takes up possible uses in law of biology and discusses
evolution as metaphor and model and the necessity to assess carefully the human
behavior that the law seeks to constrain and liberate. Some examples will be drawn
from recent scholarly work in environmental law and from the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. The emphasis here will be on identifying ineffective law that is of low
functional value because it is inattentive to the behavioral realities of the context
it seeks to influence.
II. A SHORT EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF HoMo SAPIENS SAPIENS
The evolutionary history of Homo sapiens sapiens has been written and rewritten
15. FRANS B.M. DE WAAI, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATS 173 (1989).
16. See MAJOR EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE 143 0. William Schopf ed., 1992).
17. Id
18. lId See also DE WAAL, supra note 15, at 173 (presenting an evolutionary diagram based on DNA
comparisons with somewhat different dates of divergence). See general, WE. LEGROS CLARK, HISTORY
OF THE PRIMATES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF FOSSIL MAN (5th ed. 1966).
19. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION REVEALS A
UNIVERSE WITHOUT DESIGN 263 (1986). See aho JANE GOODAL, THROUGH A WINDOW. MY THIRTY YEARS
WITH THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE 249 (1990).
20. Frans B.M. de Waal, Address Before the Gruter Institute Conference on the Uses of Biology in
Law (June 22, 1992) (transcript available from the author).
21. Id
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many times,22 although the earliest form clearly admitted to the human lineage
goes back 3-4 million years ago to the genus Australopithecus afarensis.23 Many of the
innovations we tend to associate with creatures that are distinctly human were made
by species that are not our own-bipedalism (4 mya), the fashioning of stone tools
(2 mya), the taming of fire (500,000 years ago).24  Even the celebrated increase in
brain size (that was firmly in place 100,000 years ago) was initiated and shared by
ancestor species that we would not call human:
25
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MILLIONS OF YEARS BEFORE PRESENT
The Neanderthals, who are considered an archaic form of our own species,
died out perhaps 30,000 years ago. 26 They probably were the first to domesticate
the dog in the late paleolithic some 50,000 years ago.27 Their burial practices evi-
22. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EvOLUrION AND PREHISTORY, THE WORLD OF EARLY MAN Uean
Guilaine ed., Facts on File Publications, 1991) (1986) (emphasizing especially the scientific methods for
studying prehistory); see also ROBERTJ. WENKE, PATTERNS IN PREHISTORY: HUMANKIND'S FIRST THREE MII,
LION YEARS (2d ed. 1984); DONALD C. JOHANSON & MAITLAND A. EDEY, Luc. THE BEGINNINGS OF Hu-
MAN KIND (1981); Bruce Bower, Erectus Unhinged- Debate Over a Human Ancestor Reflects Deeper Splits
Concerning the Nature of Fossil Spedes, 141 ScI. NEws 408 (1992).
23. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at xxviii; see also DONALD
JOHANSON & JAMES SHREEVE, LucY's CHILD: THE DISCOVERY OF A HUMAN ANCESTOR 104-16 (1989) (on
the placement of Australopithecus afarensis on the evolutionary tree leading to Homo sapiens).
24. ISAAC ASiMOV, ASIMOV'S CHRONOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND DISCOVERY 1-7 (1989). See alsoJOHANSON
& EDEY, supra note 22, at 249 (for a photograph of the famous Lactoli footprints). The skeleton of Lucy
is 3.5 million years old, and she clearly walked in an erect fashion. Id at 203.
25. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLoGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 548 (1975). Graph taken from id. See
aso JOHN E. PFEIFFER, THE CREATIVE EXPLOSION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF ART AND REuGION
86 (1982) ("[B]y 250,000 years ago cranial capacity ranged between 1,250 and 1,550 cubic centimeters,
about what it is for the great majority of people alive today.").
26. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 366; see also Michel Bar-
baza, From the Middle Paleolithic to the Epipaleolithic in the Old World, in id at 47, 52.
27. See JOHN C. MCLOUGHLIN, THE CANINE CLAN: A NEW LOOK AT MAN'S BEST FRIEND vii (1983).
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dence some form of religion, 28 and with religion came art, although it did not ap-
proach the sophistication and subtlety of the creations that first appeared in the
more recent phase of the Old Stone Age some 30,000 years ago. 29 With religion
and art undoubtedly came language, though structural limits on the Neanderthal
palate put a strict ceiling on this prospect.
30
The earliest species classified as Homo is Homo habilis, which was found some
2 mya in Olduvai Gorge on the edge of the Serengetti Plains, in what is now north-
ern Tanzania. 31 This species was clearly a hunter-gatherer, "actively hunting small
or medium-sized animals as well as scavenging the carcasses of bigger ones and gath-
ering plant foods. We have no evidence clearly demonstrating that these early hu-
mans used [fire] or constructed shelters."32  Both of these breakthroughs
undoubtedly came with the arrival of Homo erectus, the longest-lived species of our
own genus, which is found in the fossil record from 1.7 million to 250,000 years
ago.33 Individual members of this species stood as high as five feet, six inches,
34
and in social structure they were probably hunters and scavengers living in stable
bands of twenty to thirty individuals with a rudimentary language35 and toolmak-
ing skills that far exceeded their predecessors.
36
Both genetics and paleoanthropology suggest today that sub-Saharan Africa
was "the cradle" of anatomically modern humans, perhaps as early as 200,000 years
ago, with gradual radiations outward around the globe.37 The "Middle/Upper Pa-
leolithic transition" generally refers to the time period from 250,000 to 30,000 years
ago,38 and it is marked by the identification of differences between Homo erectus
and Homo sapiens, both physically (modern humans have a somewhat larger average
brain size, increases in body size, and changes in facial architecture) and socially (a
proliferation of tools and weapons, dramatically more subtle art forms, and the ap-
pearance of artifact styles and trade in exotic items "that bespeak the first manifes-
28. See WORLD RELIGIONS: FROM ANCIENT HISTORY TO THE PRESENT 22-24 (Geoffrey Parrinder ed.,
Facts on File Publications 1983) (1971); see also PFEIFFER, supra note 25, at 99-101.
29. See PFEIFFER, supra note 25, at 1, 100. "Lascaux is one of more than 200 caves in western Europe
containing examples of the first prehistoric art, works dating back to the Upper Paleolithic or most
recent phase of the Old Stone Age that began 30,000 years ago." Id at 1.
30. SeeJOHN MCCRONE, THE APE THAT SPOKE: LANGUAGE AND THE EvOLUTON OF THE HUMAN MIND
171 (1990).
31. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at xxvii, 265.
32. Id at xxviii-xxix.
33. See id at xxix-xxx.
34. BRIAN M. FAGAN, THE JOURNEY FROM EDEN: THE PEOPLING OF OUR WORLD 17 (1990).
35. See WENKE, supra note 22, at 90 (summarizing conclusions of Frank Poirier); see also LIONEL TI-
GER & ROBIN Fox, THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL 215 (1971).
36. See FAGAN, supra note 34, at 17.
37. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 265-74; see also FA-
GAN, supra note 34, at 230 (discussing work of Cavalli-Sforza); cf ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION
AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 20-22 (discussing competing theories of the origins of modern hu-
mans). The appearance of modern humans is usually placed somewhere around 50,000 - 100,000 years
ago. Id at 21.
38. See WENKE, supra note 22, at 101.
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tation of some sort of regional 'ethnic' identity that exceeds by a wide margin the
local band society").3 9 These several relationships in the human fossil record can
be depicted as follows:
40
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Two representations of relationships in the human fossil record. On the left, a family tree showing known ranges
(solid vertical bars) and possible range extensions (broken bars) of the various species recognized; light oblique lines
indicate possible paths of descent On the right, a cladogram more formally expresses hypothesized relationships
among the various species.
39. Id.
40. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EvoLturION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at xxix. Chart taken after
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It is an accurate approximation to say that much of humanity's evolutionary
history took place in the savannas of East Africa and in social structures that we
would describe comfortably as hunter-gatherers.4 1 Admitting to great uncertainties
and using the techniques of several sciences,42 scientists theorize that humans in
this world lived in small communities populated by kin, friends, allies, acquaintan-
ces, and rivals; 43 disputes were resolved face-to-face, and skills in reconciliation, con-
flict avoidance, and deceit were indispensable;44 friendships were common, and
reciprocity mattered;45 the handicapped were supported;46 long periods of infant
dependency required a high degree of parental investment by both sexes (although
females were the primary caretakers) and widespread monogamous pair bonding; 47
exit from the group was possible for the individual and perhaps was encouraged to
prevent inbreeding, but ostracism often must have been a virtual death sentence;
48
spheres of activities were assigned to the public and private, at least in an approxi-
mate way,49 but privacy could not have approached the alienation and anonymity
known in modern society; status differences' existed, but these are likely to have
been quite flexible, given the necessities of alliance-building and the strong pros-
pect that leadership roles rotated as individuals moved through different stages of
their lives;50 division of labor among sexes also occurred, with the women gather-
ing and the men hunting or pursuing different foraging strategies, but these lines
must have been fuzzy too, especially in times of crisis (which were not uncom-
mon);51 personal property and personal space undoubtedly existed, but claims to
larger territories more likely took the form of common property claims for the ben-
efit of the group and to the exclusion of other groups;5 2 competition with other
41. Seegenerally RICHARD E. LEAKtY, HUMAN ORIGINS (1982).
42. See, e., Gordon H. Orians, An Ecological and Evolutionary Approach to Landscape Aesthetic; in
GRUTER INST. FOR LAW AND BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, READER ON THE USE OF BIOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF
LAW 125 (1992) (ecology); LEAKEY, supra note 41 (paleontology); ROGER LEWIN, IN THE AGE OF MANKIND
(1988) (anthropology); TIGER & Fox, supra note 35 (anthropology); JOHANSON & SHREEVE, supra note 23,
at 222-44 (paleoanthropology and archeology); DE WAAL, supra note 15 (primatology and ethology);
GOODALL, supra note 19 (primatology and ethology); SAHLINS, supra note 4 (economics and anthropol-
ogy); OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Roger Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1986)
(political science, anthropology, sociology, law);, WILuIAM H. CALVIN, THE ASCENT OF MIND: ICE AGE Cu.
MATES AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE (1990) (neurology, geophysics, climatology; paleontology);
KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN SENSIBILITY (1983) (history,
religion); WILSON, supm note 25, at ch. 27 (sociobiology, sociology); C. Owen Lovejoy, The Oigin of Man,
211 Sci. 341 (1981) (anthropology, human anatomy); Philip R. Thompson, A Behavior Modelfir Austral-
opithecus africanus, 5 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 547 (1976) (anthropology, animal behavior); Robin Fox, In
the Beginning: Aspects of Hominid Behavioral Evolution, 2 MAN 415 (1967) (anthropology); Larry Arnhart,
Feminism, Primatology, and Ethical Naturalism, 11 PO. & THE LIFE SCI. 157 (1992) (primatology, political
science).
43. See WILSON, supra note 25, at 567.
44. See generaly DE WAAL, supra note 15.
45. See WILSON, supra note 25, at 551-53.
46. See REN9 DUBos, BEAST OR ANGEL 46 (1974).
47. See Lovejoy, supm note 42, at 343.
48. See generally OSTRACISM, supm note 42.
49. See WILSON, supra note 25, at 574 (figure 27-8).
50. Id at 554.
51. Id at 567. "[There is no compelling reason to conclude that men did the hunting while women
stayed at home." Id.
52. See PETERJ. WILSON, MAN: THE PROMISING PRIMATE 6-8 (1980).
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groups was highly likely, and in this context severe aggression could occur;53
food-sharing and food transport were widespread, and these practices reinforced di-
visions of labor, improved communications and tool use.54 Life was linked inti-
mately to events in the environment, and thus views of the physical world
invariably found expression in social, political, aesthetic, and cultural practices.
As our brief account moves across the divide between history and prehistory,
55
some of the important dates for Homo sapiens sapiens are 10,000-12,000 B.C., when
goats were domesticated, 56 8000 B.C., which marked the first moves to agricul-
ture,57 5000 B.C., the first irrigation,58 3500 B.C., the emergence of writing in the
Sumerian culture, 59 3100 B.C., when the city-states of the Nile delta were united in
Egypt,60 and 2500 B.C., when the first literature appears in written form.61 A date
of special interest to lawyers is some time around 1775 B.C. when Hammurabi,
King of Babylon (reign 1792-1750 B.C.) had his law code inscribed on an
eight-foot-high stone pillar of hard diorite. Down its face appear "twenty-one col-
umns of finely written cuneiform, outlining nearly three hundred laws that were
to govern people's actions and guide the King and his officials in dispensing jus-
tice."62 If Hammurabi's Code is the first expression of "stipulated law" in our legal
tradition, the "customary" law of collective and habitual practices of human beings
obviously is much older. When one appreciates that "culture," as it is traditionally
defined, is found in a large number of animal populations, 63 including the pri-
mates,64 one can make the case that the customary law to which Homo sapiens sapiens
is heir dates back millions of years and thousands of generations. If we stop at 30
million years, when Darwin's baboons went their separate way, we could sum up
the situation by declaring that .0008333 percent of our legal tradition (measured
by time) falls in the modern era of "stipulated" law, leaving .9991667 percent of our
53. See WILSON, supra note 25, at 564-65.
54. See id at 567-68.
55. Seegeneralo HERBERT BUTrERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF HISTORY (1981); BERNARD GRUN, THE TIME-
TABLES OF HIsTORY: A HORIZONTAL LINKAGE OF PEOPLE AND EVENTS 2 (Ist ed. 1982) (based on Werner
Stein's Kulturfahrplan) (first exactly dated year in history is -4241).
56. See ISAAC ASIMOV, CHRONOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND DISCOvERY 10 (1989). See generally JuLIET
CLUrTON-BROCK, A NATURAL HISTORY OF DOMESTICATED MAMMALS, INTRODUCTION (1987) (discussing an
1865 essay by Francis Galton concerning conditions under which animals might become domesticated).
57. See ASIMOV, supra note 56, at 10-12. On farming as a last resort, see Luigi L Cavalli-Sforza, The
Transition to Agriculture and Some of Its Consequenc, in How HUMANs ADAPm. A BIOCULTURAL ODYSSEY
103, 117 (D.J. Ortner ed., 1983). "Observations on [sic] Pygmies suggest that the transition happens only
in areas in which traditional life has become truly impossible because of destruction of the natural hab-
itat, and there is intense exposure to the agricultural way of life, as exemplified by neighbors." Id
58. See ASIMOV, supra note 56, at 15.
59. Id at 19.
60. Id at 20.
61. Id at 23. "Telling stories is probably as old as speech, and gifted storytellers were probably as
much in demand fifty thousand years ago as they are today." 1d
62. Id at 28.
63. JOHN T. BONNER, THE EvOLunON OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS 171 (1980). "IBly culture we mean
behavior transmitted from one individual to another by teaching and learning." Id (discussing culture
among both vertebrates and invertebrates).
64. Seegeneraty DE WAAL, supra note 15 (giving many examples of rule-following and hierarchy-hon-
oring behavior of the nonhuman primates).
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tradition in the domain of "customary" law, experience, and spontaneous order.
An understanding of these older traditions might help in fashioning contemporary
interventions.
III. A PRIMER ON EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, NATURAL SELECTION, AND ETHOLOGY
As background for consideration of legal questions, this section will address
some of the basic assumptions and definitions that hold sway in the field and the
generally recognized theories. For the most part, evolutionary explanations of
traits and behavior of creatures are functionalist, in that the things animals do are
understood to enhance and advance opportunities for survival and reproduction.,
There is nonetheless a substantial body of evidence and theory for nonfunctional
and even dysfunctional behavior in living species, and this experience may be par-
ticularly pertinent to thinking about law. In this context, we will take up the sub-
jects of peacocks' tails, pandas' thumbs, and the chattering habits of red squirrels.
A. Darwin and the Functionalist Explanation
Evolution is the hypothesis that all organisms on earth are descended from a
few, early ancestors by a process that Charles Darwin described as "descent with
modification." 65 As stated by Robert Trivers:
By 'evolution' Darwin meant both modification over time and descent from
common ancestors; that is, creatures have changed in shape and behavior
over vast periods of time, and, in addition, all lineages traced backwards even-
tually converge. If we go back about 20 million years, we ourselves are con-
nected to all other apes. Likewise, about 150 million years ago our lineage
converges with those of all other mammals. And finally, if we go back a half
billion years ago, all vertebrates are seen to have sprung from a common an-
cestor.
66
The principal mechanism of evolutionary change, identified independently by
Darwin and one of his contemporaries, Alfred Russell Wallace, is "natural selec-
tion." 67 This is the term used to describe the processes that maintain or alter gene
frequencies in a population based on overreproduction, genetic variation, and sur-
vival of best-adapted and most reproductively successful organisms in a particular
65. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 194; see EVELYN F.
KELLER & EUzAaEmH A. LLOYD, KEYWORDS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (1992) (a series of essays on the
meaning of the key evolutionary terms).
66. ROBERT TiuERs, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 10 (1985).
67. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 7.
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environment.68 Adaptation, which accounts for the strong functionalist lessons of
evolutionary biology, can be defined as an item of behavior, a physiological pro-
cess, or an anatomical property of a phenotype (outward characteristics of an indi-
vidual) that has been shaped by natural selection to perform a specific role.69 The
capacity to learn is an evolved trait 70 and a valuable adaptation for many species.
It is this concept of adaptation that offers the "evolutionary biological explanation
for. the design apparent in nature, where organisms appear to display a close fit to
their environments."
7 1
Evolution, natural selection, and adaptation are theories, but the processes to
which they refer also are facts that have been confirmed experimentally, used in
prediction, and invoked to link together thousands of observations from diverse
fields such as comparative anatomy, embryology, ethology, geology, paleontology,
botany, genetics, biochemistry, and zoology, among others.72 Nature's beautifully
designed, specialized features and behaviors are known to us all, but the point can
be reinforced and underscored by an avalanche of particulars:
Members of the cat family, for example, have razor-edged cheek teeth that
allow them to cut meat with great efficiency. Horses, on the other hand, are
equipped with broad cheek teeth covered with low ridges, which are well suit-
ed to the task of grinding up harsh grasses that contain tiny fragments of
silica. Plants, too, exhibit a variety of forms and features that differ accord-
ing to the plants' ways of life. Most tree species that are native to tropical
rain forests, for example, have leaves that are, for the most part, waxier than
those of plants found in cool regions, and a typical tropical leaf terminates
in an elongate tip called a drip point. The drip point and the waxy surfaces
help the leaves shed the rainwater that falls on them daily in a rain forest;
68. G. LEDYARD STEBBINS, DARWIN TO DNA, MOLECULES TO HUMANITY 474 (1982).
69. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EvOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 7.
70. See WILSON, supra note 25, at 548.
71. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 7. See also SALVADOR E.
LURIA Er AL, A VIEW OF LIFE 574-77 (1981); STEVEN M. STANLEY, EARTH AND LIFE THROUGH TIME 135-41
(2d ed. 1986).
72. Compare PETER B. MEDAWAR & JEAN S. MEDAWAR, ARISTOTLE TO ZOos: A PHILOSOPHICAL DIC
TIONARY OF BIOLOGY 92-94 (1983) with MILNER, supra note 14, at 157-59 and STEPHEN J. GOULD, BULLY
FOR BRONTosAuRUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 458 (1991) (claiming Darwinian theory is con-
fined to "how life changes" after it originates). The physicists are fond of reminding us that everything
that has happened in the universe an instant after the Big Bang is consistent with the laws of physics
as we know them. See generally STEVEN WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUrES (1976); JOHN D. BARROW
& JOSEPH SIL, THE LEFT HAND OF CREATION: THE ORIGIN AND EvOLUTION OF THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE
(1983); JOSEPH Silu, THE BIG BANG (2d ed. 1989y, GEORGE GREENSTEIN, THE SYMBIOTIC UNIVERSE: LIFE
AND MIND IN THE COSMos (1988) (listing the coincidences upon which life in the universe depends).
Everything that happens in biology must be consistent with the laws of physics. See DAVID ATrENBOR.
OUGH, LIFE ON EARTH: A NATURAL HISTORY 23342 (1979). Biologists and chemists have not yet solved
the problem of how inorganic components aggregated to life. This looks like an evolutionary question
although the mechanisms of population, change, and selection are not Darwinian. See infra part V.B.,
See also JOHN POSTGATE, MICROBES AND MAN 24344 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the famous Miller/Urey
experiments producing organic acids and amino-acids from chemicals in an environment thought to
resemble early Earth); A. GRAHAM CAIRNS-SMIH, SEVEN CLUES TO THE ORIGIN OF LIFE: A SCIEN-
TIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1985). Before the Big Bang, the territory belongs exclusively to cosmology
and religion.
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the waxy surfaces also keep them from drying out in the tropical heat. In
contrast, the leaves of another rain-forest plant, the bromeliad, form a cup
that acts as a private reservoir for rain. Without this feature, the bromeliad
would dry up and die, because it lives high above the moist forest floor, at-
tached to trees. Yet another rain forest plant, the Venus'-flytrap, secretes a
sweet nectar that lures insects into the midrib of its leaf. On the margins of
these leaves are rows of spines that mesh when the leaves snap shut around
an unsuspecting insect. The Venus'-flytrap then devours the insect in a re-
versal of the normal roles of plant and animal.
73
For obvious physical reasons, plants are incapable of flight as a response to preda-
tors. Their adaptations, instead, have turned toward chemical defenses, 74 which is
why they are of such great interest today to the pharmaceutical industries of hu-
mans.
There is no reason to expect Homo sapiens sapiens to have been immune from
selective pressures on form, function, tastes, preferences, and modes of problem
solving, including our thoughts and feelings about justice and behavior. Thus, a
variety of evolutionary accounts have been constructed to explain who we are, how
we think, and what we do.75 The color of human skin? Those residing in the north
of Europe were at risk for rickets from too little vitamin D and calcium. Thus,
"fair-skinned, nontanning individuals who could utilize the weakest and briefest
doses of sunlight to synthesize vitamin D were strongly favored by natural selec-
tion."76 By contrast, near the equator vitamin D was never in short supply and
73. STANLEY, supra note 71, at 135-36 (turtles on the Galapagos Islands). See also CHARLES DARWIN,
THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION 42-43 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia
Britannica 1952) (1859):
When we see leaf-eating insects green, and bark-feeders mottled gray; the alpine
ptarmigan white in winter, the red grouse the color of heather, we must believe
that these tints are of service to these birds and insects in preserving them from
danger.
A structure used only once in an animal's life, if of high importance to it,
might be modified to any extent by natural selection; for instance, the great jaws
possessed by certain insects, used exclusively for opening the cocoon - or the hard
tip to the beak of unhatched birds, used for breaking the egg.
74. See generally WILSON N. STEWARr, PALEOBOTANY AND THE EVOLUTION OF PLANTS (1983).
75. See, eg., CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DAR.
WINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991); ROBERT ORNSTEIN & PAUL EHRLICH, NEW WORLD, NEW
MIND: MOVING TOWARD CONSCIOUS EVOLUTION 196 (1989) ("[W]e need tribalistic relationships, we are
more responsive to current information than to long-term trends, and we focus on the superficial ap-
pearances of everything from automobiles to presidents."). See generaly, A Critque of Puyr Reason, ECON-
OMIST, July 24, 1992, at 73-74. "A new psychology says that the mind is not a computer that works by
rules of logic, but a set of tools evolved to help people live pre-industrial lives." Id (reviewing work
of Leda Cosmides, Stanford University, and John Tooby, University of California at Santa Barbara).
"Given this view of man-a natural trader, ever concerned with social debts and an uncertain future-it
is little wonder that human minds are interested in detecting cheats, not pursuing pure logic, and in
sampling frequencies rather than making risky one-off guesses." Id
Untestable and fanciful evolutionary accounts of how animals acquired particular traits are of-
ten described as Just-So stories, named after Rudyard Kipling's children's tales that explained "how
the elephant got his trunk (a crocodile bit it and stretched it) or how the camel got his hump (rolling
around in lumpy sand dunes)." MILNER, supra note 14, at 245.
76. See MARVIN HARRIS, OUR KIND: WHO WE ARE, WHERE WE CAME FROM AND WHERE WE ARE
GOING-THE EVOLUmON OF HUMAN LIFE AND CULTURE 114 (1989).
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calcium was easily obtained from vegetables.77 Skin cancer was the main problem:
"Darker infants were favored by parents because experience showed that they grew
up to be freer of disfiguring and lethal malignancies. Black was beautiful because
black was healthy."7 8 A taste for sweets? The presence of sugar was a good barom-
eter to judge the ripeness of fruits in times long past, and thus those who acquired
the taste gained a survival advantage over their fellows who lacked it.79 A capacity
for sympathy? Those who acquired it were better off in face-to-face dealings and
reciprocal exchanges because they retained a wider range of win-win interactive
prospects.80 A disposition for moral aggression? Those so disposed could expect
higher returns from lagging reciprocators than those who consistently turned the
other cheek.81 Emotions and sentiments of remorse? They can cause a person to
behave honestly even when a rational assessment of self-interest suggests he could
get away with cheating: "And if others realize he feels this way, they will seek him
as a partner in ventures that require trust."
8 2
There is no intention here to elevate the concept of adaptation into some
all-powerful explanation for the sentiments, dispositions, and actions of human be-
ings. To be sure, adaptation is a concept that reappears in religious and cultural
theory as functionalism, 83 and it shows up in legal theory in strong explanations
of how individuals in cultural groups can solve problems of resource use by spon-
taneous mechanisms of ordering.8 4  But, from the beginning, the adaptation of
Darwinian evolution has gone hand-in-hand with maladaptation. This is a theme
to which we will return:
Adaptation, for Darwin, was a process of becoming rather than a state of fi-
nal optimality. Progress through successive improvement of mechanical rela-
tions was the characteristic of evolution in this scheme. It must be
77. Id. at 114.
78. Id
79. TIGER, supra note 2, at 25-26. "[H]aving a 'sweet tooth' also enabled hunter-gatherers to refrain
from consuming unripe foods that might be dangerous, sometimes even fatal. Sugar was not only a
rich source of calories but an irreplaceable diagnostic tool for choosing healthy food." Id See also D.
MICHAEL STODnART, THE SCENTED APE: THE BIOLOGY AND CULTURE OF HUMAN ODOUR (1990).
80. Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of RecprocalAltruism, 46 Q. REv. BIOLOGY 35, 49 (1971). "If the
recipient's gratitude is indeed a function of the cost/benefit ratio, then a sympathetic response to the
plight of a disliked individual may result in considerable reciprocity." Id
81. See Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of Social Regulariiy and Its Relation to the Human
Sense ofJusticz, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 241 (Roger D. Masters & Mar-
garet Gruter eds., 1992).
82. Robert Frank, Emotion and the Costs ofAltruism: The Economic Foundations of the Sense ofJustice, in
id at 47, 51. See generally Richard D. Alexander, Biological Considerations in the Analysis ofMoralisy (forth-
coming) (manuscript on file with author).
83. See Richard C. Lewontin, Adaptation, in CONCEMrUAL ISSUES IN EVOLUmONARY BIOLOGY: AN AN.
THOLOGY 235, 235-36 (Elliot Sober ed., 1984). See general MARVIN HARRIS, COWS, PIGS, WARS AND
WITCHES: THE RIDDLES OF CULTURE (1974) (an impressive collection of functionalist essays); JOHN READ.
ER, MAN ON EARTH (1988) (convincing descriptions of ecological adaptations by humans living in all
sorts of environments).
84. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES vii (1991)
(a splendid book demonstrating nicely "that people frequently resolve their disputes in cooperative fash-
ion without paying any attention to the laws that apply to those disputes.").
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remembered that for Darwin, the existence of 'organs of extreme perfection
and complication' was a difficulty of his theory, not a proof of it. He called
attention to the numerous rudimentary and imperfect forms of these organs
that were present in living species. The idea that the analysis of living forms
would show them, in general, to have optimal characters, would have been
quite foreign to Darwin. A demonstration of universal optimality could only
have been a blow against his progressivist theory and a return to ideas of spe-
cial creation.85
B. Building the Theories Evolutionary Fitness, Altruism, and Spite
"A shorthand way of describing natural selection is to say that it favors the
individual that leaves the most surviving offspring, or favors the traits that permit
an individual to leave the most surviving offspring."86 The theory thus rests on
the idea (counterintuitive for many humans) that individual members of a species
will organize their lives to produce as many surviving offspring as they can. Evo-
lutionary biologists, then, would "never expect a pair of herring gulls to say to
themselves, so to speak, 'Well, we've bred successfully for three or four years, and
we've produced 10 surviving offspring; why don't we just retire and live out our
days without the quacking of chicks and this constant regurgitating of food?'
'8
Thus, Darwinian fitness is defined, rather technically, as "the number of offspring
of an individual" (relative to the mean) "that live to reproduce in the next genera-
tion."8
8
In practice and in theory, this bedrock assumption of reproductive selfishness
had to be supplemented and expanded to account for observations in nature of be-
havior that is described as "altruistic" or "spiteful." Altruism, in biology, is behav-
ior that brings advantages to others at a cost to the giver.89 Spite is the opposite
side of the coin; it is an interaction that inflicts costs on both parties, and thus is
difficult to explain since it should be opposed by natural selection's action on each
party.90 This summary will address "altruism" theory in biology as it has been ex-
tended outwards by ideas of (1) kinship, (2) reciprocal altruism, (3) indirect reci-
procity or reputation, (4) commitment, and (5) pure, or capital "A" Altruism,
which is a sacrificial act undertaken to benefit strangers remote in time and place.
All five versions of altruism should figure in lawmaking interventions of our own
day.
85. Lewontin, supra note 83, at 250. See also DARWIN, supra note 73, at 236. "The wonder indeed
is, on the theory of natural selection, that more cases of the want of absolute perfection have not been
detected." Id
86. TsrvEvS, supra note 66, at 20.
87. Id
88. CAMBRIDGE DIcnoNARY oF BioLOGy 113 (P.M.B. Walker ed., 1989).
89. See id at 11. See also MEDAWAR & MEDAWAR, sra note 72, at 11.
90. TRivERS, supra note 66, at 57. Spiteful encounters are rarely of the equal-cost variety; obviously,
spiteful behavior can prevent another from competing at a later date.
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- 1. Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness
A much admired paper by William D. Hamilton in 1964 expanded the altru-
istic circle from self to others by pointing out that individual reproductive advan-
tage must be measured by success in passing along not one's body but one's genes.
91
As it turns out, of course, "copies of an individual's genes are also present in close
relatives, and the closer the relationship, the larger the percentage of shared genes.
In sexually reproducing diploid organisms [such as humans], siblings hold half
their genes in common." 92 Applying this simple quantitative reasoning, "if an in-
dividual finds itself in a situation where it may either save itself or die to save three
siblings, it should, for its own fitness, sacrifice itself. For, in so doing, it will pass
1500/0 of its genes along in the continued reproduction of its three siblings."93 A
famous quip made by J.B.S. Haldane to John Maynard Smith sums up the same
idea: "[H]e said he was willing to lay down his life for two brothers or eight cous-
ins."94 Hamilton's theory of kin selection (that the reproductive best must be mea-
sured from the perspective of the entire group of related individuals) 95 has enjoyed
strong success in biology by explaining activities such as heroic and sacrificial acts
among the social insects96 and "helpers" or "auntie" behavior among Florida jays
who forego their own reproductive opportunities to lend a hand in the rearing of
relatives.97 Hamilton's ideas have come to be known in evolutionary biology as
inclusive fitness, the concept that reproductive success by the individual can be
achieved by helping collateral relatives and by producing and helping descendant
relatives.
A lawyer cannot read Hamilton without thinking of the no-duty-to-rescue rule
in U.S. tort law, which is a universal that must have had its origins in
stranger-to-stranger interactions. One suspects that a rule of such selfishness would
not be tolerated in a society with lots of kin nearby or lots of people who might
91. William D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1
(1964).
92. LuIA ETAL, supra note 71, at 587. See also BERT HOLLDOBLER & EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE ANTs
181 (1990). The book describes "Hamilton's rule" as C/B < b, meaning:
that the cost C (which is the loss in expected personal reproductive success
through the self-sacrificing behavior) divided by the benefit B (the increase in the
relatives' expected reproductive success) must be less than b, the probability that
the relatives have the same allele .... Another way of expressing Hamilton's rule
is to say that the benefit to relatives is discounted by their degree of relationship,
so that the less the relatedness, the greater the benefit must be to counter-balance
the cost.
Id
93. LURIA ETAL., supra note 71, at 588.
94. Quoted in MEDAWAR & MEDAWAR, supra note 72, at 12.
95. LURIA ETAL, supra note 71, at 772.
96. HOLLDOBLER & WILSON, supra note 92, at 179-80 (suicidal defense and foraging among ants; no
reproduction among workers).
97. See generally GLEN E. WOOLFENDON &JOHN W. FITZPATRICK, THE FLORIDA SCRUB JAY. DEMOGRA-
PHY OF A COOPERATIVE BREEDING BIRD (1984), discussed in TRIvEPs., supra note 66, at 187-92.
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be kin.98 But Hamilton's thesis falls short of explaining the more famous of rescue
cases-among them, the heroic behavior of Lennie Skutnick who dived into the icy
Potomac to save air-crash victims who happened to be perfect strangers. 99 We will
return to the case of Lennie Skutnick to illustrate the several theories of altruism.
2. Reciprocal Altruism
In 1971, Robert Trivers coined the term reciprocal altruism to describe helping
behavior that can get started and thrive among individuals with long memories,
frequent interactions, and stable social networks. 100 The phrase can be given a
modest quantitative cast by defining reciprocal altruism as "the trading of altruistic
acts in which benefit is larger than cost so that over a period of time both enjoy a
net gain." 1° 1 There is invariably a problem of free-riders and cheaters, and biolo-
gists have had difficulty explaining the persistence of warning cries among birds
where there is thought to be a tendency to look the other way rather than raise a
hue and cry and draw the attention of the predator. 0 2 Reciprocal altruism occurs
in extraordinary contexts-the trading of blood among vampire bats,10 3 the
medical-service/food interactions between so-called host fish and their cleaners
who remove parasites, 104 and the joint hunting parties of coyote and badger which
benefit mutually from a speed/digging combination in the pursuit of ground squir-
98. SeeJOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN WESTERN
EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 3 (1988) (mentioning an interesting argument by
.several prominent theologians of the early church that men should not visit brothels or have recourse
to prostitutes because in doing so they might unwittingly commit incest with a child they had aban-
doned."). Lawrence Tribe invokes this no-duty rule to justify abortion by choice of the mother by lik-
ening the fetus to some unwelcome stranger. LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES
130-32 (1990), discussing Judith J. Thompson, A Definse of Abortion, 47 J. PHIL & PUB. AFF. 1 (1971) (ad-
vancing the hypothetical of imagining oneself waking up one morning attached to a famous and ac-
complished violinist who will be unable to live on his own for a period of 24 weeks). A more convincing
argument (and one that Hamilton might make) is that a woman who seeks an abortion will be denying
herself an opportunity to enjoy the closest of kin (50/s genetic sharing), and she should be allowed to
make the choice because no one on the planet has a larger genetic investment or a better understanding
of how a new arrival would affect kinship relations.
99. Robert H. Melton, A earAfer Icy Rescu Skutnic's Life is Quieter, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1982, at
Va. Wkly. 3 (on the man who leapt into the icy Potomac to rescue survivors of the Air Florida crash).
"After a flurry of accolades-including a standing ovation from Congress during President Reagan's State
of the Union speech, free tickets to Redskins games, 2,000 fan letters and several awards for heroism-
Martin Leonard Skutnick III's life is almost back to normaL" Id
100. Trivers, supra note 80, at 35.
101. TRivERs, supra note 66, at 361.
102. See WILSON, saea note 25, at 123. "[T]he warning call is acoustically designed to make it dif-
ficult to locate in space. Id (pointing out difficulties in devising a test to distinguish kin selection
warning calls from individual selection warning calls (they may simply discourage predators from stay-
ing in the neighborhood), not to mention reciprocity warning calls). Similarly, the slap of the beaver's
tail might be an act of self-preservation (this hunter won't be here next time), a benefit for family mem-
bers, or a payback for prior favors. On the possible use of deception in the use of warning cries among
vervet monkies, see EUGENE S. MORTON & JAKE PAGE, ANIMAL TALK: SCIENCE AND THE VOICES OF NATURE
130-31 (1992).
103. See TRVERS, supra note 66, at 363-66 ("About the only thing Wilkinson did not show about
vampire bats "is that they get angry when associates fail to reciprocate meals." (discussing Gerald S.
Wilkinson, Reciprocal Food Sharing in the Vampire Bat, 308 NATURE 181 (1984))).
104. Id at 47-49. "When a grouper fish has a cleaner- in its mouth and is attacked by a predator,
it does not swallow the cleaner and flee; it warns the cleaner to exit, the cleaner exits, and then the
grouper flees." Id at 48.
[VCol. 65
BIOLOGY AND THE LAW
rels.105 Trivers' own favorite example is the drawn-out, tit-for-tat exchange of eggs
and sperm between hermaphroditic sea bass (which have both male and female re-
productive organs in one individual) where first one, then the other takes turns in
producing hard-to-make eggs and easy-to-make sperm. 10 6 The cross-species trades
are especially interesting, and they have been observed in interactions of the African
honey-guider, a bird, which will lead people to the beehive in return for some left-
over beeswax, 107 and perhaps also in dolphins, which have been known to come to
the aid of floundering humans.
10 8
As one might expect, the primates that enjoy long lives and frequent interac-
tions are likely practitioners of reciprocal altruism. 10 9 This prediction is confirmed
by observations of sexual, fighting, grooming, and food-exchange behavior.
110
Chimpanzees, it would appear, can identify nonreciprocitors and distinguish the
generous from the stingy. They reward individuals who are reliable givers and sanc-
tion those who are not. They also tolerate reciprocity shortfalls from handicapped
individuals. 1
11
In his 1971 article, Trivers:
skillfully related his genetic model to a wide range of the most subtle human
behaviors. Aggressively moralistic behavior, for example, keeps would-be
cheaters in line-no less than hortatory sermons to the believers.
Self-righteousness, gratitude, and sympathy enhance the probability of receiv-
ing an altruistic act by virtue of implying reciprocation. The all-important
quality of sincerity is a metacommunication about the significance of these
messages. The emotion of guilt may be favored in natural selection because
it motivates the cheater to compensate for his misdeed and to provide con-
vincing evidence that he does not plan to cheat again. 1
12
Humans, one suspects, are the most sophisticated of all the reciprocal altruists, and
there are few corners of legal life that would not benefit from a scrutiny of tit-for-tat
and related strategies. E.O. Wilson interprets the drowning man rescue cases as in-
stances of reciprocal altruism. 113 One small indicator of this prospect is the pop-
105. Kathryn A. Minta & Steven C. Minta, Partners in Carnivoty: NorthAmerica's Coyotes and Badgen
Have an Andent Bond, NAT. HisT., June, 1991, at 60.
106. See Trivets, supra note 80.
107. MORTON & PAGE, supra note 102, at xxv-xxvi. This will also attract badgers; "it will lead its
'assistant' as much as a half-mile to a bees' nest and wait patiently while the nest is torn open." Id at
Xxvi.
108. Set TilVuts, supra note 66, at 382-86 (humans are likely to be the accidental beneficiaries of
widespread mutual helping behaviors that frequently cross species lines among these long-lived mam-
mals).109. See id at 368-72. Also seegenerally FRANs B.M. DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX
AMONG APES (1985).
110. See de Waal, supra note 20.
111. See id
112. WILSON, supra note 25 (paraphrasing TuvESts, supra note 66).
113. I
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ularity in law schools of Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation,l l4 which
already has been cited in more than a hundred law review articles.
115
3. Indirect (or Reputational) Reciprocity
Reputation is likely to matter among the social primates, although there is ev-
idence of extreme toleration of anti-social behavior so long as it does not affect the
observer.116 It was concern for reputation that brought forth the celebrated re-
sponse of the spouse of the Bishop of Worcester to the findings of Darwin-"let us
hope," she said, that our relationship to the monkeys "doesn't become widely
known." 117 The common law's classical fourfold categories of slander per se obvi-
ously are aimed at stemming the erosion of reputation that can feed the social fuel
of ostracism: 118 allegations of sexual misconduct, which hurt one's reputation
within the kin group; of dishonesty in business, which impair future reciprocal
dealings; of criminality, which spreads the reputational damage to the immediate
social group; and of a loathsome disease, which is a decided turn-off among ac-
quaintances and strangers alike.
To Richard Alexander, reputation provides the key to explaining "the striking
human tendency to generate moral systems, discuss morality endlessly, and adhere
to moral rules in particular circumstances" and to explaining "why humans tend
widely to identify as immoral actions within their groups that they nevertheless re-
gard as highly moral between groups." 119 Indirect reciprocity, in Alexander's
scheme, gives rise to behavior that can be described as "indiscriminate benefi-
cence"1 20 because A's kindness to B is expected to be returned not by B but by ob-
servers C, D, and E. Indirect reciprocity, then, necessarily implicates "reputation
and status, and results in everyone in a social group continually being assessed and
114. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLLTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
115. A Westlaw search of the TP-ALL database found 127 references to Axelrod's work, including
the following: Stephen M. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 33 (1992); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1,21 (1992); Lawrence Crocker,
The Upper Limit ofJust Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1075 (1992).
116. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE AGREE TO THINGS 129-40 (1984) (ex-
plaining the bystander inaction in the Kitty Genovese case by reference to biological principles of relat-
edness and the psychological principles of ambiguity and social proo. Compare TRIBE, supra note 98,
at 130 (discussing spectator murder) with GoODM, suprs note 19, at 75-84 (toleration in chimpanzees
of infant-killing and cannibalism).
117. Quoted in BARASH, supra note 6, at 7.
118. See Howard C. Anawalt, Ostracism in the Law of Defamation, in OSRACISM, supra note 42, at 181
(concluding, though, that the law of defamation is inadequate to protect against a variety of social con-
sequences resembling ostracism, .PATRICIA L WiLLIAms, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DI-
ARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) (describing racism as "spirit-murder," which could be described as
ostracism).
119. Alexander, supra note 82, at 16. A reputation for aggressiveness obviously has different conno-
tations for in-group and out-of-group interactions.
120. Id at 2. See also RCHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 97 (1987); MORAL.
ITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON: THE PRESUPPOSITONS OF SOcIOBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH (G.S. Stent ed.,
2d ed. 1980).
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reassessed by interactants, past and potential, on the basis of their interactions with
others." 121 To extend the example of Lennie Skutnick's rescue of the drowning
woman, 122 Hamilton would save her because she is kin, Trivers because she might
return the favor, and Alexander because others might watch and would heap hon-
ors and rewards on the rescuer and his kin.
Reputational reciprocity has appeared in limited ways among other species
that live in groups, 123 but the requirements for its emergence (recognition of con-
specifics, long memories, distinction of motivations, and fine social accounting)
are sufficiently demanding to expect refinement and elaboration only in human
interactions. Alexander adds an accelerator effect to his theory (the emergence of
indirect reciprocity "led to the evolution of ever keener abilities to observe and in-
terpret situations with moral overtones") 124 and describes it by citing legal philos-
opher Roscoe Pound's account of the many conflicts of interest that arise among
humans who live in groups. 125 Humans have become extraordinarily adept at so-
cial accounting, Alexander would say, because the chief selective pressure on our
species over time has not been clumsy mastodons, vicious cave bears, or insidious
parasites:
If an external threat is invoked to explain human social groupings-as appears
necessary-the only one adequate to the task is other groups of humans ....
This proposition is immediately satisfying, for it can explain any size of
group (as parts of balance-of-power races); it accords with all of recorded hu-
man history; it is consistent with the fact that humans alone play competi-
tively group-against-group on a large and complex scale; and it accords with
the ecological dominance of humans as a species. In effect, organized in
competitive groups, humans have become their own principal "hostile force
of nature." Most of the evolution of human social life, and I will argue the
evolution of the human psyche, has occurred in the context of within- and
between-group competition, the former resulting from the latter. Without
the pressure of between-group competition, within-group competition would
have been mild or nonexistent--or else dramatically different-because groups
would have been smaller and would have required less unity and cooperative-
ness.
126
121. ALEXANDER supra note 120, at 85.
122. See Melton, supra note 99.
123. Compare Jane B. Lancaster, Pnmate Social Behavior and Ostracism, in OSTRAcisM, supra note 42,
at 67 with Jane Goodall, Social Rejeaion, Exclusion, and Shunning Among the Gombe Chimpanzees, in id at 79.
124. ALEXANDER, supra note 120, at 100. "Population-wide indiscriminate beneficence might also
evolve when small 'populations' are regularly composed of relatives related to a similar degree, and if
the individuals of other populations are never contacted and therefore not discriminated against." Id
125. Id at 33-34, (quoting Roscoe Pound, My Philosophy of Law, in CREDOs OF SiXTEEN AMERICAN
ScHoLARS 251, 259, 261 (1941)).
126. Id at 79-80.
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Reputation, then, can take us a long way. But, does it convincingly explain
the behavior of Lennie Skutnick? Did he really face those icy waters because of all
those benefits that would accrue?
4. Commitment and Passion
Stage four in our discussion of "altruism" theory in biology appears in an el-
egant book by economist Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason.127 It presents a
so-called commitment model for explaining actions that look very much like all
cost and no benefit to the actor. Frank's book is filled with moving examples of
admirable deeds by those who rush to the rescue, leave extravagant tips to unknown
waitresses in far away places, and who turn away from "golden opportunities" (eg.,
finding a wallet full of cash in a deserted park) that offer rewards for social defec-
tion with no one being the wiser. These traits of saintly self-sacrifice are much ad-
mired in our society, and indeed are sometimes rewarded if the word leaks out
about a particular deed. Discover someone who has passed up a "golden opportu-
nity," my property students are fond of reminding me, and you have identified a
likely winner in the personal property finder cases.
128
But how would such self-sacrificial traits originate and thrive in a population
of fitness maximizers? Frank's answer is that net social benefits are likely to accrue
to those who develop and demonstrate emotional commitments to ethically com-
mendable outcomes. Those who instinctively shun the "golden opportunity" will
be rewarded by others who are looking for a person they can trust:
This benefit comes from both the responses of social interactants to the evi-
dence of the existence of the commitment, and to the readiness of the actor
to act in ways seemingly contrary to his own interests without having to pon-
der the question .... In other words, just as it pays not to dwell consciously
on the rhythm of the heartbeat or how fast to breathe, it sometimes pays to
conduct social acts without prior conscious calculation, even if as a result of
foregoing conscious reflection occasional mistakes occur. 129
The social benefits of strong emotions are not frequently acknowledged in the Unit-
ed States law schools that are strongly committed to calculating reason. Yet
sentimentality and passion have their place. Indeed, Alexander has argued:
127. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
128. St, eg., Hannah v. Peel, 1 KB. 509 (1945) (a personal property finder's case that appears in
most of the first-year property casebooks; the lost property (a brooch)goes to the finder who passes up
the golden opportunity (by handing the find over to the police) rather than the owner of the building
where the property was found).
129. Alexander, supm note 82, at 22.
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that we have evolved incomplete control of the emotions to dispel the notion
that we are in complete control of our emotions in particular situations.
This hypothesis implies that incomplete control of the emotions-or unwant-
ed expression of them such as blushing, uncontrollable anger, or uncontrol-
lable sexual excitement-occurs in interactions with others of great
importance to us, especially when we are establishing, cementing, or further-
ing the relationship, and much less or not at all in casual or brief interac-
tions. Without such lapses we appear as 'cold fish' who have our emotions
entirely under control, or as uncommitting individuals who are not under-
going the changes and indecisions involved in establishing an expensive so-
cial investment, therefore that the current involvement is not particularly
important to us. The costs of occasional mistakes from not employing our
conscious abilities in all social encounters may sometimes be high, but the
costs of being discovered to be insincere are enormous.
130
Under this fourth extension of "altruism," then, a passionate Lennie Skutnick
will jump into the water to save the floundering victim without a moment's
thought to higher reward. 131 Even under this version, though, the system is driven
by an ultimately selfish interpretation that explains short-term sacrifices only in
terms of longer-term gains. As Lennie Skutnick rushes to dive into the icy waters
of the Potomac River, we call this a temporary act of derangement that yet might
redound to his own benefit.
5. Pure, or Capital "A", Altruism
Acts of altruism that require a personal sacrifice with no expectation or pros-
pects of reward, short or long term, remain to be explained. These are the kinds
of demands being made on humans in the present world, where A's comfort is
taxed for the benefit of strangers halfway around the globe and B's immediate fu-
ture is dimmed to advance the cause of somebody else's children who will appear
in future generations.
Biologists have not explained how we can send acts of altruism soaring to new
heights, but they have identified evolutionary constraints that hobble our thinking
and action, and have suggested how we may work around these constraints by con-
scious cultural evolution and education in long-term thinking. 132 There is, more-
over, no rule in biology that forbids a trait or behavior selected for one purpose
130. Id at 23-24.
131. See MELVIN KONNER, WHY THE REcKLEss SURVIVE: AND OTHER SEcRErs OF HUMAN NATURE 138
(1990). "If you are designed, emotionally, for survival and reproduction, then you are not designed for
perfect safety." Id (in the typology developed below, this is described as a Chinese-menu explanation).
See also Melton, supra note 99 (the Lenny Skutnick rescue).
132. See genrad! KONNER, supra note 131, at ch. 9.
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from being put to quite another.133 After all, the evolutionary breakthrough that
brought feathers to the birds was a thermal-insulation innovation, but the seren-
dipitous consequence was flight and the opening up of new environments of op-
portunity. And the habitual helping behavior developed among some species of
dolphins and whales has been extended fortuitously to entirely unrelated beneficia-
ries such as humans. 134 Yet, while we wait for revolutions in ethical thinking, it
would be wise to get on with the job of solving legal problems with the clumsy but
imperfect tools of human kinship, reciprocity, reputation-enhancement, and com-
mitment.
IV. FROM ADAPTATION TO MALADAPTATION: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AS AN HIS-
TORICAL SCIENCE
The discussion above emphasizes that adaptive perfection is not to be expected
from a functioning Darwinian system. As further background for consideration
of possible applications in law of the thinking of evolutionary biology, this Section
will develop a typology of maladaptation to supplement the story of miraculous
adaptation and powerful functionalism that is at the heart of Darwin's theory of
natural selection. This story of maladaptation will be presented under the headings
of (1) Chinese menus, (2) peacocks' tails, (3) pandas' thumbs, (4) chattering squir-
rels, and (5) bats' wings.
A. Chaotic and Indeterminate Characteristics
It is important to keep in mind that the predictive power of Darwinian theory
is tarnished by the examples about to be elaborated. All those traits, behaviors, and
tendencies observed in the natural world are sometimes a product of Darwinian
fitness selection, and sometimes not. What kind of a science is this whose bedrock
hypothesis is pocked with exceptions and whose strongest predictions are discount-
ed by probabilities?135 What kind of a science is this that must postulate chance
events of chemical assemblage (a miracle?) to get the system going in the first
133. Compare ROBERT ORNSTEIN ETAL, THE AMAZING BRAIN (1984) with ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 474 (defining preadaptation) and infra part IV.B.5 (bats'
wings).
134. TRIVERS, supra note 66, at 382-86; see also GOULD, supra note 72, at 408 (quoting Thomas H.
Huxley, "Will the progress of research prove that justice is worthless and mercy hateful?"). Compare id.
at ch. 22 with CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM ch.
12 (1987) and THE SENSE OFJUsncE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAw 296-99 (Roger D. Masters & Mar-
garet Gruter eds., 1992) (comments of Robert Cooter and E. Donald Elliott).
135. ERNST MAHR, THE GRoWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT DIvERfsmY, EVOLUTON, AND INHERIT-
ANCE 37-38 (1982). "[Tlhere is only one universal law in biology: 'All biological laws have exceptions.'"
Id But c. id at 137. ("When I say: 'A territory-holding male songbird has a 98.7%... chance to be
victorious over an intruder,' I can hardly claim to have established a law.").
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place?136 And what kind of a science is this whose founder, Darwin, had a "low
opinion" of mathematics and in which mathematics plays a muted role?
137
The answer is that evolutionary biology is an historical science focusing on the
study of complex systems, not unlike investigations of the weather patterns, the
movements of the earth, the oceans, and the drift of the galaxies. The study of
evolutionary biology is the study of systems that: (1) move in a fashion constrained
by the past yet informed by the generation of information from within;
138
(2) demonstrate ambiguous features of gradualism and episodic response; 139 and
(3) display chaotic, nonlinear, and unpredictable characteristics. 140 In the words of
Harvard biologist Ernst Mahr:
The indeterminacy of most strictly biological processes no longer stands in
sharp contrast to a strict determinacy in physical processes. The study of the
effects of turbulence in galaxies and nebulae, as well as in the oceans and
weather systems, has shown how frequent and powerful are stochastic process-
es in inanimate nature .... Only absolute predictions are impossible owing
to the complexity of the hierarchical systems, the high number of possible
options at each step, and the numerous interactions of simultaneously occur-
ring processes. Weather systems and cosmic nebulae are, in that respect, not
in principle different from living systems.14 1
136. DAWKINS, supra note 19, at ch. 6; see also MANFRED EIGEN & RuTHILD WINKLER-OswATITsCH,
STEPs TowARDs LIFE (1992).
137. MAHR, supra note 135, at 39. Quantitative approaches are now well established in biology and
derivative fields. See generally FRANK C. HOPPENSTEADT & CHARLES S. PESKIN, MATHEMATICS IN MEDI-
CINE AND THE LIFE SCIENCES (1992); LUIGI .L. CAvALu-SFoRzA & M.W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION
AND EvoLunON: A QUANTITATIVE A'PROACH (1981).
138. Compare JAMES GLEICi, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 260 (1987) ("[a]s the system becomes
chaotic, however, strictly by virtue of its unpredictability, it generates a steady stream of information.
Each new observation is a new bit") with STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE: REFLECTIONS IN
NATURAL HISTORY 18 (1985):
[Historical] methods are comparative, not always experimental; they explain, but
do not usually try to predict;, they recognize the irreducible quirkiness that his-
tory entails, and acknowledge the limited power of present circumstances to
impose or elicit optimal solutions; the queen among their disciplines is taxonomy,
the Cinderella of the sciences. As I wrote in Hens' Teeth and Horses' Toes, I
watched with almost detached amusement as history slowly emerged in the fore-
front of my concerns .... The flamingo's smile (like the panda's thumb) is its
synecdoche-a quirky structure, constrained by a different past, and cobbled
together from parts available.
139. Compare DAWKINS, supra note 19, at ch. 8 (evolutionary systems are filled with recursions,
feed-back mechanisms, etc.) with id at ch. 9 (the most celebrated 'sudden" event in evolutionary
biology is island speciation, which is a migration event rather than an evolutionary event) (discuss-
ing theories reflected in books such as NILES ELDREDGE, TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF DAR-
WINIAN EvOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA (1985)).
140. Compare PAUL DAvis & JOHN GRIBBIN, THE MATrER MYTH: DRAMATIC DISCOVERIES THAT CHAL-
LENGE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PHYSICAL REALITY (1992) and MAHR, supra note 135, at 58 (reasons for
indeterminacy in biological systems include their great complexity, the frequency at which unex pected
novelties emerge at higher hierarchical levels, and randomness (e.g., mutations)) with id at 59 ( [elach
organic system is so rich in feedbacks, homeostatic devices, and potential multiple pathways that a com-
plete description is quite impossible") and RIANE EISLER, THE CHALICE AND THE BLADE: OUR HISTORY,
OUR FUTURE (1987) (reassessing the history of human evolution from the twin perspectives of feminist
and chaos theory).
141. MAHR, supra note 135, at 43.
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These stochastic processes and chaotic outcomes contain strong suggestions for the
study of law.
B. Evolutionaiy Maladaptation
1. Chinese-menus
The Chinese-menu effect of evolutionary theory is the recognition that selec-
tion for one trait or behavior can carry along as baggage other traits or behaviors
not selected. Thus, choosing one from column A means that you get two from
column B. Biologists employ a number of technical terms for linkages of this sort.
Pleiotropy, for example, is a condition where a particular gene affects more than
one trait or behavior, 142 and these traits or behaviors may be expressed at different
times. An illustration of the Chinese-menu effect at work in the field of evolution-
ary biology can be found in the so-called pleiotropic theory of senescence in hu-
man beings.143  One can intuit that death and the conditions leading to it are
suspiciously maladaptive phenomena in Darwinian terms. They can be explained
as collateral consequences of a selection for beneficial effects earlier in life:
Thus, either a gene with early beneficial effects and late deleterious effects, or
one with beneficial effects early in life and none at any other time, would
lead to senescence unless it could be replaced by an allele with equally bene-
ficial effects at all times in life-which is highly unlikely because selection is
not equally effective, and does not always operate similarly, across the whole
life span.
144
For our immediate legal purposes, the central point is that the good and the
bad, the adaptive and the maladaptive, can be packaged in a single unit (the
Good-Bad) that must be taken as a whole. Negotiators across all walks of legal life,
from bargaining over the content of administrative rules to international
treaty-making, are well aware of the tactical implications of linkage and sever-
ance.
145
142. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 88, at 227. See also CALVIN, sapra note 42, at
34. "Sometimes a feature is shaped by natural selection for another feature, one that is linked to the
first feature because they share a common developmental mechanism as when selection for precocious
puberty also serves to produce shorter stature and smaller adult teeth." Id at 161. In humans, other
selection pressures dragged big heads along as an "unwanted side effect." John M. Smith, Optimization
Theory in Evolution, in CONCET'UAL ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 83, at 289, 298. "A
particular difficulty arises because genes have pleiotropic effects, so that selection for trait A may alter
trait B; in such cases, any attempt to explain the changes in B in functional terms is doomed to failure."
Ide
143. See George C. Williams, Pliotmy, Natural Seledion, and the Evolution of Senescence, 11 EVOLUTION
398-411 (1957). After a certain age, death can be adaptive in the inclusive fitness sense.
144. ALEXANDER, supra note 120, at 46-59.
145. See generalb? DOUGLAS J. AMy, THE POLTIcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION ch. 4 (1987).
[Vol. 65
BIOLOGY AND THE LAW
2. Peacocks' Tails
Sexual selection is a process in evolutionary biology by which "an individual
gains reproductive advantage by being more attractive to individuals of the other
sex." 146 Darwin himself took a particular interest in this "aesthetic" side of nature's
work, and invoked "female choice" as the explanatory agent for a wide variety of
male adornment and song.147 In our day, sexual selection is a popular hypothesis
for explaining a number of extravagant traits and behavior across the animal world
(large noses, huge testicles, gargantuan antlers, long beaks, extended tails, reckless
flying, boastful strutting, frantic dancing), 148 not to mention a number of
death-defying human behaviors. 14 9 Studies by ethologists and others have shown
that males and females in a number of animal populations engage in a protracted
process of salesmanship/sales-resistance preparatory to mating.1 5 ° Often, the fe-
males really do decide, and the interesting question is whether they are moved by
good taste, good sense, or some combination of the two.
15 1
Not surprisingly, the functionalists are winning a toehold in this sexual selec-
tion debate, and evidence is accumulating that females choose mates on the basis
of utilitarian factors such as resistance to parasites, stamina, size, and strength.1 5 2
There remains, nonetheless, a role for dysfunction in this theory, with the gro-
tesquely long tails of the birds of paradise (such as the peacock's) offered as the
prime exhibit.153 A glance at these creatures suggests there is surely a price to pay
(in predator vulnerability) for being attractive, and it shows up in a living package
of compromised design built simultaneously to look good and to move quickly. It
146. See MAHR, supra note 135, at 595-96; MILNER, supra note 14, at 403-04.
147. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEx 366 (Robert M.
Hutchins, Encyclopedia Britannica ed., 1952) (1871). "[Flemale birds in a state of nature, have by a long
selection of the more attractive males, added to their beauty or other attractive qualities." Iet at 368
(females "are most excited by, or prefer pairing with, the more ornamented males, or those which are
the best songsters, or play the best antics.").
148. See HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK: ALTRUISM AND SExUAL SELECrION FROM DAR-
WIN To TODAY, pt. 2 (1991). See also WILSON, supra note 25, at 318-24. Wilson develops a distinction
between epigamic selection, "which consists of the choices made between males and females," and in-
trasexual selection, "which comprises the interactions between males or, less commonly, between fe-
males." lt at 318.
149. See eg., JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEF: THE EvoLUnON AND FUrURE OF THE Hu-
MAN ANIMAL ch. 11 (1992) (eg., hang-gliding, rock-climbing, drug-snorting).
150. Compair MAHP., supra note 135, at 596-97 with WILSON, supra note 25, at 320.
151. CRONIN, supra note 148, at 205.
152. Compatr id at 209-10, 218 with TRIVERS, supra note 66, at ch. 14 and id at 358-59. Indeed, in
mate selection among steelhead fish, whose judgment would you give the greater deference to-a female
steelhead, or a male Homo sapiens with an advanced degree in fisheries from Oregon State University?
Cf. HELMUT TRIBUTSCH, WHEN THE SNAKES AWAKE: ANIMALS AND EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION (1982) (a va-
riety of sensory advantages can elevate animal prognostication capabilities of natural events far above
those of humans). This is not to say, of course, that animals, as well as humans, are immune from
systematic "errors" in their risk-assessment repertoire. See DAWKINS, supra note 19, at 203-06.
153. CRONIN, supra note 148, at 113. "[Tihe peacock's tail is an extravaganza-flamboyant, bizarre,
exaggerated, ornamental, apparently of no earthly use and actually damaging to its over-burdened bear-
er." Compare MORTON & PAGE, supra note 102, at 90 ("chuck" calls of male tfingara frogs attractive to
females but also to predatory bats; he "strikes a balance between mating and longevity by giving 'chucks'
when other males are calling 'chuck' too") with ii at 109 (another "compromise": the "bright blue of
a whiptail lizard's tail evidently makes him more attractive to females, but also more visible to the local
roadrunner.").
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is unnecessary for our purposes to resolve why it is that pea hens collectively have
driven their mates to such a suboptimal state.154 However, a safe bet is that this
decision-making regime is influenced chiefly by conspicuous diagnostic "markers,"
and that tail length is an excellent marker of overall fitness even though it repre-
sents a particularized liability.1
55
The simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals is hardly a novel phenomenon in
law.156 However, the peacock's experience underscores again that doing two things
at once precludes optimization of either goal.
3. Pandas' Thumbs
The panda's thumb is the prototypical example of evolutionary imperfection
resulting from irreversible historical events. The panda, it appears, is an ordinary
bear that turned to its vegetarian life (it now subsists almost exclusively on bamboo)
somewhat late in its evolutionary history.157 With its true thumb irrevocably com-
mitted to its ancestral role as the running and clawing digit of a carnivore, the only
option for natural selection was to go to work on a bone from the wrist, called the
radial sesamoid, and turn it into a passably flexible digit that the animal uses
adroitly to manipulate the stalks of bamboo. The panda, then, eats her breakfast
with her wrist, although she does a nice job of it. As Harvard professor Stephen
Jay Gould explains:
An engineer's best solution is debarred by history. The panda's true thumb
is committed to another role, too specialized for a different function to be-
come an opposable, manipulating digit. So the panda must use parts on
hand and settle for an enlarged wrist bone and a somewhat clumsy, but quite
workable, solution. The sesamoid thumb wins no prize in an engineer's der-
by. It is, to use Michael Ghiselin's phrase, a contraption, not a lively contriv-
ance. But it does its job and excites our imagination all the more because it
154. DAWKINS, supra note 19, at 203-06 (discussing the consequences of "linkage disequilibrium"
that can occur when the genes for tails of a given length coincide with the corresponding genes for
preferring tails of that same length; this is a Chinese-menu explanation with positive feedback or run-
away features). See also TuawRS, supra note 66, at 332-35. Trivers discusses experiments with long-tailed
widowbirds showing that "females prefer males with artificially enlarged tails and discriminate against
those with cropped tails." Id at 333. These experiments could be said to exploit and to underscore the
female birds' predilection to focus on the tail as a marker of overall fitness.
155. See CRONIN, supra note 148, at 227-29. "Would we expect the hero of the excess quota to look
like a seven-stone weakling?... [A] male shoulders his burden precisely in order to advertise his quality,
to proclaiw his ability to take it on and yet cope in spite of it. . . ." Id. at 228. On the use of biologic
markers in environmental health research on humans, see COMM'N ON BIOLOGICAL MARKERS, BOARD
ON ENVn. STUDIES & TOxIcOLOGY, COMM'N ON LIFE ScI., NATIONAL AcAD. OF SCI./NAT. RESOURCE
COUNcL, BIOLOGICAL MARERS IN REPRODUCrivE TOXICOLOGY 18 (1989). "[Markers can be signals or
indicators of normal physiology or forerunners of health impairment .... Markers can indicate
susceptibility, exposure to an exogenous agent, internal dose, biologically effective dose (dose at receptor
site), early biological effect, structural or functional alteration, physiological status, or disease." Id
156. See 2 WIuLAM H. RODGER, JL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw. AIR & WATER § 4.3 (1986).
157. TERRY DoMIco, BEARS OF THE WORLD 123-41 (1988).
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builds on such improbable foundations.158
No writer has captured better the hold that history has on evolutionary pros-
pects than Stephen Jay Gould, who describes a world of gerry-built morphology,
second-best physiology, and makeshift behavior.15 9 This is a world of vestiges, bor-
rowings, fusions, Rube Goldberg machines, and get-by opportunism. The "useless,
the odd, the peculiar, the incongruous," are the "signs of history,"160 according to
Gould, and maladaptation says more about the processes of evolution than perfect
adaptation possibly could:
No evidence for evolution pleased Darwin more than the presence in nearly
all organisms of rudimentary or vestigial structures, 'parts in this strange con-
dition, bearing the stamp of unutility' as he put it. 'On my view of descent
with modification, the origin of rudimentary organs is simple,' he contin-
ued. They are bits of useless anatomy, preserved as remnants of functional
parts in ancestors.
161
In evolution, moreover, there is no turning back. Louis Dollo, the Belgian pa-
leontologist, gives us Dollo's law, which tells us that "it is almost impossible for a
long sequence of genetic changes in a population to be reversed in an order exactly
opposite to the one in which they originally developed." 162 This means, among
other things, that a species eliminated by extinction will be gone forever. Also to
be reckoned with is Romer's rule, developed by Alfred Romer, Harvard evolution-
ary biologist, who explains that animals will undergo "minor mutations" in order
to avoid enduring "major evolutionary adaptations." Thus, it is "genetically easier
to turn green when your territory becomes grassy than to develop wings or the
speed of a panther." 163 This means that evolution can take a certain direction to-
wards refinements and specializations, and this trend can be reinforced by the in-
158. STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MoRE REFLECrIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 24 (1980).
159. See id at chs. 1-3; STEPHEN J. GouLD, HENs' TEErH AND HORsES' TOES: FURTHER REFLECTIONS
IN NATURAL HisToRy chs. 3, 4, 9, 11, 19 (1983); STEPHEN J. GouLD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN
NATURAL HISTORY chs. 9-11, 23-24 (1977); GOULD, supra note 72, at chs. 7-9; GOULD, supra note 138, at 18
(historical sciences "recognize the irreducible quirkiness that history entails and acknowledge the limited
power of present circumstances to impose or elicit optimal solutions . . .
160. GouLD, sum note 158, at 128.
161. Id at 29.
162. STANLEY, sutpra note 71, at 162. See aho LURIA ETAL, supra note 71, at 642-45. "The principles
of irreversibility and lack of momentum teach us something important about the nature of evolution.
There are no definite directions, no strict causal determinism producing identical results in similar cir-
cumstances. The path of environmental change through time is tortuous and undirected." Id at 645.
163. TIGER, supra note 2, at 37 (invoking Romer's Rule to explain the development of human cul-
tural differences that allow us to retain basic human patterns).
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escapable laws of physics.164 Natural selection, thus, can move a species towards a
specialized and adaptive peak, which is understood simply as a "position of high
fitness associated with a specific environment." 165 In changing environments, spe-
cies that run out of innovations like the panda's thumb can be trapped by their
own specialization on peaks that have become maladaptive.
166
Workers in the field of law should be sympathetic to the lessons of the pandas'
thumbs, which instruct us in the art of the possible by resort to the means available.
Rube Goldberg is the metaphor of choice in the lawmaking game. Students of the
legal system are still awaiting the discovery of our Dollo's law, which can explain
the directional drift and durability of statutes. 167 And we await further articulation
of a made-for-law Romer's rule, which can explain the tendency of the players to
tinker with, amend, and modify, rather than move wholesale to a dramatically dif-
ferent legal strategy.
4. Cats' Tails and Squirrels' Chattering
A strong source of maladaptation in the natural world arises because traits or
behaviors selected as functional in Environment One quickly can become dysfunc-
tional in Environment Two. The examples are everywhere about us: the cat's tail
is a wonderful signaling device in the wild, 168 but a positive liability in a human
society of closing doors; the red squirrel developed a chattering strategy to discour-
age pursuit by the great horned owl, 169 but is now paying the price at the human
predator armed with a rifle appears on the scene; the moth's sensitivity to light
gave navigational reliability based on the moon, but it is a source of mayhem with
the arrival of the environmental novelty of the night light. 170 In the wrong envi-
164. See eg., STEVEN VOGEL, LIFE DEVICES: THE PHYSICAL WORLD OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS 4 (1988).
"[M]uch of the design of organisms reflects the inescapable properties of the physical world in which
life has evolved, with consequences deriving from bot constraints and opportunities." /d; COIN J.
PENNYCUICK, NEWTON RuLES BIOLOGY: A PHYSICAL APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (1992);JOHN B.S.
HALDANE, ON BEING THE RIGHT SIZE AND OTHER ESSAYS 6 (John M. Smith ed., 1985) ("[F]or every type
of animal there is an optimum size."); GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN, supra note 159, at 177 ("Large or-
ganisms, like large churches, have very few options open to them. Above a certain size, large territorial
animals look basically alike-they all have thick legs and relatively short, stout, bodies."); JOHN M. SMITH,
EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES, 1-9 (1982) (on the respective roles of developmental constraint
and adaptation).
165. MONROE STRICKBERGER, EvOLLTION 465 (1990).
166. Compare id. ("A population may therefore increase in fitness during evolution but nevertheless
reach an intermediate peak which is not necessarily the most adaptive,") with STEBBINS, upra note 68, at
282 ("[A]nimals can make an adaptive shift to a new way of life only if the existing structures prepare
them for the shift.").
167. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 260-72 (1992) (discussing Martin Shubik's Dol-
lar Auction, which is a game that exploits the players' desire to avoid sunk costs; it has a
'throw-good-money-after-bad" feature that may help explain the persistence of some no-win legal
strategies); Alfred R. Light, Illuminating Irrationalify: Behavioral Research and the Superfund Law, 7
Toxics LAW RPTR. 694, 722 (1992) (two-part article using Shubik's analysis and other behavioral
research to cast light on the Superfund law).
168. DESMOND MORRIS, CATLORE 30-32 (1987).
169. BERND HEINRICH, ONE MAN'S OWL 73-74 (1987).
170. ALEXANDER, spra note 120, at 23.
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ronment, it can be a liability for fish to have eyes, insects to have wings, sea skirts
to have brains.
171
Homo sapiens sapiens is not immune from this evolutionary time-lag, in matters
both trivial (avoidance behavior that works to ward off fellow humans actually can
attract an unwelcome housecat), 172 and consequential (inclination to sweets,
self-deception, errors in risk calculation, abuse of privilege, proclivity to nepo-
tism). 173  In today's world of rapidly changing environments, maladaptation can
become the norm.
A strong lesson of time-lag maladaptation is that there is no best behavioral
strategy for all times and all environments.174 Optimization is a concept that works
in evolutionary theory only in limited contexts, with frozen backgrounds and ac-
knowledged constraints.175 No organism ffinctions independently of its environ-
ment, 176 and no environment can be changed without changing the organisms that
are part of it. Nature does not exist apart from nurture. 177 The ultimate measure
of success is strikingly conditional. As W.D. Hamilton reminds us, 178 within the
genes of every wimp there lurks a superman who may emerge in a different world
of tomorrow.
In law, we expect time-lag maladaptation to appear in various guises. The best
known manifestation of the phenomenon, perhaps, is in the emergence of desue-
tudenal statutes that present special challenges of repair and rehabilitation.
17 9
Horse-and-buggy laws always present special difficulties in the age of the automo-
bile.
171. See, e.g., DESMOND MoRius, ANIMALWATCHING 79-85 (1990) (death-feigning, self-mutilation); id
at 69-79 (deflection and startle displays); see also STEBBINS, supra note 68, at 22 ("The vast majority of
evolutionary lines, when faced with the challenge of a vast environmental change, become extinct rather
than evolve.").
172. See MORRIS, supra note 171, at 77.
173. See, eg., DUBos, supra note 46, at 26-27 (sickle cell gene in African populations causes an anemia
that confers resistance to malaria (a Chinese-menu carryover); in regions (such as the U.S.) where malaria
has been eliminated, the sickle cell gene is all liability and no benefit (a chattering squirrel problem)).
174. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Fox and the Chickens: Mr. Justice Douglas and Environmental Law,
in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 215-25 (Stephen
L. Wasby ed., 1990).
175. John M. Smith, Optimization Theory in Evolution, in CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN EVOUTIONARY Bi-
OLOGy, supra note 83, at 289. "The undoubted existence of maladaptive traits, arising because evolution-
ary change is not instantaneous, is the most serious obstacle to the testing of optimization theories."
Id at 296.
176. Compae 7 U.S.C. § 136() (1988) (the term "environment" defined to include man) (Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)) with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia,
Rio and the New Millenium, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at 21 (the big eroblem is "man's attitude toward
the world, toward nature, toward other humans, toward being itself; Havel condemns the "arrogance
of modern man" who believes "he understands everything and knows everything;" even the term "en-
vironment" is a product of this anthropocentrism: "It implies that whatever is not human is just some-
thing that envelops man - surroundings that are inferior to him and that he should find and develop
in his own image.").
177. MASTERS, supra note 75, at epilogue (on dissolution of the nature/nurture distinction).
178. W.D. Hamilton, Address Before the Gruter Institute Conference on the Uses of Biology in
Law June 22, 1992) (transcript available from the author).
179. GUIDO CALABREsi, THE COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
19931
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
5. Bats' Wings
Preadaptation is the awkward terml 80 used by biologists to describe behaviors
and traits that can be modified by natural selection to perform functions quite un-
like those served by the original design. 181 A preadapted trait functions in role A
for ancestors but, by good fortune and sheer chance, is "well suited" for transforma-
tion to perform a "very different" role B for descendants. 182 The shift in function
from A to B can be said to be a product of sheer serendipity, by which is meant
the accidental discovery of an outcome not sought.183 This capacity to stumble, as
it were, upon new ways of conducting business underscores the nonlinear features
of Darwinian evolution that carries these prospects of sudden phase-change and
reorganization at different levels.
Examples of preadaptation in nature are legion, as evolution works over time
to seize the opportunities open to it., In one sense, the panda's wrist could be said
to be preadapted as a thumb; the gill arches of ancient fish have been transformed
into jaw bones;184 the jaw bones in some mammals have become earbones; 185 the
vocal pouches and indeed the stomachs of some species of frogs have been co-opted
as a temporary womb for the protection of the young. 186 The conventional ac-
count of the development of flight, from the first fossil bird (Archaeopteryx) on-
wards, is that feathers appeared originally as an insulation device or as a kind of
webbing to trap small prey, only to be pressed into service for ends not imagined.187
The example of the bat's wings probably followed the same route by which an or-
dinary flap for gliding or fly-catching or body-heating accidentally became an ex-
traordinary flying machine.
188
Homo sapiens, no less than other species, shows strong signs of serendipitous
preadaptation. The modern human brain was in place as long ago as 100,000
180. Sec GOULD, supra note 72, at 144 (preadaptation "seems to imply that the proto-wing, while
doing something else in its incipient stages, knew where it was going-predestined for a later conversion
to flight;" recommending use of term "exaptation" to embrace any organ not evolved under natural
selection for its current use-"either because it performed a different function in ancestors (classical pre-
adaptation) or because it represented a nonfunctional part available for later co-optation"); see also CUR-
TIS G. SMITH, ANCESTRAL VOICES: LANGUAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 49 (1985)
(preferring term "exaptation").
181. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 474.
182. LURIA ETAL, supra note 71, at 631.
183. The definition is borrowed from ROYSTON M. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY. ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERIES
IN SCIENCE x (1989).
184. LURIA Er AL, supra note 71, at 631.
185. Id at 631-32.
186. GOULD, supra note 72, at 301-06 (noting, however, that the stomach-brooding Australian frog
has become extinct).
187. See LURIA ETAL, supra note 71, at 632-35; SALLY FOY & OxFORD Sci. FILMS, THE GRAND DESIGN:
FORM AND COLOUR IN ANIMALS 106-12, 196-203 (1st Amer. ed. 1983). 'Thousands of species, from no
less than four major animal groups-insects, dinosaurs, birds, and mammals-have developed wings." Id.
at 196.
188. See ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 72, at 233-42.
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years189 and, in any event, well before the time it was needed to create cave art, do-
mesticate animals, or plan the pyramids. The emergence of the human mind is
thought to be a product of "many accidents and many changes of function."
190
The human brain is an extraordinary survival machine, but one with a redundancy
that can serve the broadest radiations of preadaptation. 191 One version of these
brain changes is that natural selection brought about radical modification of the
cortex for no "redeeming" social importance: "The accident is that the cortex en-
larged for purely 'engineering' reasons, in some large part to keep the brain reliable
during conditions of unprecedented and sudden heat stress. These extra cells could,
then, become available to be recruited for other functions."
192
The lesson of the bat's wings may have something to say to lawyers. There are
obvious parallels between the relentless opportunism that drives natural selection
and that which scours the landscape for legal advantage. Preadaptation is certainly
an observable phenomenon in law, if it is understood to mean application of a legal
189. See CHARLESJ. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0. WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORI-
GIN OF MIND 15 (1983) ("The elaboration of the human brain was very rapid, perhaps the fastest advance
recorded for any complex organ in the entire history of life. Even so, it merely set the stage for a still
more rapid change in behavior.").
190. ORNSTEIN, supra note 75, at 5; cf id. at 48:
Why did the brain grow so large before such size was needed? Or was it needed
by something we know not of? Almost every explanation had been proposed:
vision changes, tool use, throwing, painting, social organization, nakedness,
clothes, running, walking, stalking, hurling, working, shirking, maybe smirking,
and the lot. Almost surely, there was no single 'prime mover,' but an accidental
set of complex factors, all of which combined.
Set also id at 51 ("Improvements in throwing stones came as a result of neurological changes in the
brain or more likely added fuel to the selective fire. Throwing twice as far within a given time re-
quires making decisions nearly eight times as fast .... Thus, selection favored brains with parallel
circuits for improved temporary synchronizations and extra neurons in important places"); see also
WILLIAM H. CALVIN, THE THROWING MADONNA, app. B at 219 (1983) ("What hominid trait that
requires a precision sequential timing buffer is strongly exposed to natural selection? GET SET and
THROW. To throw a stone requires that you rapidly pump out a series of motor commands (to
.play a motor tape'), presumably loaded into a sequential buffer during GET SET," (citation omit-
ted); CURTIS G. SMITH, ANCESTRAL VOICES: LANGUAGE AND TE EvOLUTION OF HUMAN CON-
SCIOUSNESS 48 (1985) ("There had to be a final jump into consciousness, but there also had to be a
whole train of preadaptions to ready the brain for this new kind of function."); DANIEL C. DEN.
NETr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 194-98 (1991) (vocalizations in early humans served to elicit and
share information and overcome deception); MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 321 (2d ed.
1986) ("[Elvolution must have worked the other way: first came enhancements in abilities ....
Then, once we had the capability for using more machinery, natural selection could favor those who
grew more massive brains."); MERUN DONALD, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIND. THREE STAGES IN
THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE AND COGNITION 5 (1991) (unwise for "structural, that is, modular
models of mind [to] proliferate without regard to their biological feasibility. . .).
191. Compare ORNSTEIN, supra note 75, at 7 (the brain "is, basically, just another organ to help a
person operate in the world, to stay out of trouble, to eat, sleep, and reproduce") with LUMSDEN & WIt,
SON, supra note 189, at 84 ("[A] blank-slate mind, using pure cultural transmission, is a near impossibility
in the evolution of any intelligent species. The brain that evolved toward this extreme state would be a
purposeless calculating machine with a limited capacity for survival.")
192. Compare ORNSTEIN, supra note 75, at 65 with STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN & OLMvER KOENIG, WET
MIND: THE NEW COGNITIVE NEURDSCIENCE 441 (1992) ("[T]he brain often is opportunistic, using struc-
tures that may have evolved in one context to carry out different sorts of tasks.").
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rule in a context not contemplated by the designers.193
V. WHERE LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY MEET
Discussed next are intersections between law and biology, expressed, first, in
the development of evolutionary models and, second, in the analysis of the human
behavior that the law seeks to constrain or liberate. Both perspectives are important:
laws will have life histories, which means attention should be paid to how they are
likely to change over time; and laws seek to influence human behavior, which
means that lawmakers invariably must speculate about what people will do.
A. Evolutionary Models in the Study of Law
Before and after Darwin, evolutionary models of every imaginable kind have
been advanced to explain phenomena across the natural and social sciences. Guid-
ed by a simple metaphor of change over time, evolutionary thinking has been in-
voked to cast light on everything from collapsing empires to expanding industries
to improving race relations to the spread of disease to the rate of religious conver-
sions.194 Formally, the only prerequisites for a functioning evolutionary model are
a population of "things" (e.g., artifacts, ideas, rules), a means for introducing vari-
ation into the population, and a method of differential selection from the popula-
tion. 195 Applications of evolutionary modeling have been especially attractive to
students of environmental law, perhaps because they are familiar with the subtleties
of stochastic change endemic in the natural world. Three of these endeavors extend
193. Compare United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1983) (19th century treaty right
to take "fish" encompasses hatchery-reared stock not imagined by treaty writers) with Kell v. Appalachian
Power Co., 289 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1982) (servitudes drafted in the 1930s to protect powerlines from pro-
truding vegetation do not authorize the aerial use of herbicides producing environmental consequences
beyond those contemplated) and Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968) (broad form deeds signed in early 1900's authorize use of later-developed technology of stripmin-
ing).
194. On the use of metaphors in law, see MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR,
AND THEOLOGY (1985); see also PETERJ. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2d ed. 1989); CARL
N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SO.
CIAL THOUGHT (1991); THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY & ERNEST BOESINGER, HUMAN CULTURE: A MOMENT IN
EVOLUTION 35 (Bruce Wallace ed., 1983) ("All that was, is, and will be has evolved, is evolving, and will
evolve."); PHIUP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE
(1985); ERVIN LASZLO, EVOLUTION: THE GRAND SYNTHESIS (1987); ROBERTJ. RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE
EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1987).
195. Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Modds in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies,
in ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN ADVERSITY 211, 219-23 (1987); see also Jack Hirshliefer, Economiafrom a Biolog-
ical Viewpoint, 20 J. L & ECON. 1, 44 (1977):
[T]hey have developed models showing the working of a rich variety of mecha-
nisms of change-mutation and recombination, selection and migration, learning,
genetic drift, etc-as well as useful generalizations concerning the extent and prev-
alence of certain patterned responses to change such as mimicry, convergence,
character release, speciation, and the like.
See also George F. Oster & Edward 0. Wilson, A Critique of Optimization Theory in Evolutionary
Biology, in CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 83, at
271; John M. Smith, Optimization Theory in Evolution, in id at 289; WILSON, supra note 25, at 21-
25 (on some of the difficulties with concepts of optimization in evolutionary theory).
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to the legal world some of the lessons introduced earlier 196 on pandas' thumbs,
cats' tails, and bats' wings.
1. Cooperation, Defections, and Sleepers
The Rodgers model on statutory lawmaking 197 depicts the legislative game as
a prisoners' dilemma played over time between competing lawmakers, but with dis-
tinct end-of-the-game, last-play features at the moment of enactment. The model
obviously is a gross simplification of how laws are made. Yet, it rests upon behav-
ioral assumptions widely observed in nature, including Homo sapiens sapiens-name-
ly, a predilection to cooperate when the repeated transactions necessary for
establishment of reciprocal altruism are present, 198 and a disposition towards self-
ish behavior when they are not.199 The psychology of the lawmakers engaged in
this game-playing enhances the model, built as it is upon personalities that can
avoid decisions, hide behind ambiguities, and gain advantage by sudden stratagem.
The Rodgers lawmaking model counsels observers of the environmental laws
to look for a package of "consensus" and "betrayal" measures. 200 The products of
"consensus" include a variety of provisions calling for more study, phrased in am-
biguity, or committed to empty statements of aspiration. These are useful tools for
maintaining reciprocal civility in environments of high stress and close scrutiny.
20 1
Extravagant process also is expected as a frequent consensus-builder under the en-
vironmental laws where currencies of findings, hearings, and impact statements are
used to assuage the disappointment of potential losers.
More interesting, perhaps, are the predictions of this lawmaking model of "be-
trayal" features that depart dramatically from visions of statutes as expressions of
comprehensive rationality. These betrayal features are the products of end-of-the-
game jockeying and include measures such as sleepers (provisions with consequenc-
es exceeding the formal legislative vision) and defections (legal expressions charac-
terized by last-minute changes of substance or purpose).202 The sleepers, especially,
196. See supra part IV.
197. William H. Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirre" Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental
Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 161 (1989) [hereinafter Red Squirrl]; William H. Rodgers, The
Lesson of the Owl and the Crow. The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA.
ST. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377 (1989); see Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law:
The Drifter/Habitui Distinction, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 195 (1986). Cf William H. Durham, Advances in Evo-
lutionary Culture Theory, 19 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 187 (1990).
198. See supra part III.B.2.
199. See generally TRivERS, supra note 66, at ch. 16.
200. My personal practice is to run each of the new environmental laws through the filter of the
iterative-game model, looking for the predicted indicia of "consensus" and "betrayal." For an example
of this approach, see RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, § 3.1A (Supp. 1992).
201. Compare MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCaETY oF MIND ch. 20 (1985) with JEREMY CAMPBELL, GRAM.
MATICAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY, LANGUAGE AND LIFE (1982) (suggesting how conflicting informa-
tion and ambiguity can result in decision-paralysis).
202. See Red Squirrel, supra note 197, at 169. "[Defection techniques include] last-minute amend-
ments; secret tack-ons to appropriations bills; contrived floor debate; language in the Conference Report
contradicting the bill; and sundry other sneaky and eleventh-hour revisions." Id
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are strong reminders of the maladaptations of evolutionary theory,203 because the
statute at the moment of its enactment imperfectly serves the functions envisaged
for it by its designers.' Indeed, the lawmaking process produces statutory sleepers
of two different sorts, and both have been of seminal significance in the history of
environmental law. First are the sleepers (call them morphological, sleepers) that
result from the gaming at the moment of creation. The best-known examples, per-
haps, are Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,204 the creation of a single staffer
on the House Interior Committee, which works an absolutist protection of the crit-
ical habitat for all listed species,205 and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,206 which has had consequences that outran the wildest imagination of its
sponsors and most enthusiastic supporters.
20 7
Another variety of sleeper.(call them environmental sleepers) are occasioned
by the passage of time and change of circumstances that can give old laws striking
new meanings. These are time-lag maladaptations in the identical sense of the cats'
tails,20 8 and they too have played a prominent role in the history of environmental
law. Some better known examples include the administrative rediscovery of the
Refuse Act of 1899 in the campaign against water pollution, 20 9 the ban against
clearcutting tucked away in the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897,210 and the stop-
ping of the construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline by the width restrictions on
rights-of-way buried in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.211 Application of law that
is not adapted to the times often will produce amendment and change, but the mis-
fit is a ubiquitous circumstance.
2. Constraint and Direction
The Elliott-Ackerman-Millian ("E-A-M") model of statutory evolution 212 uses
a version of the prisoners' dilemma (called the politicians' dilemma) to explain
203. See supra parts IV.B.2 (Peacocks' Tails), IV.B.4 (Cats' Tails and Squirrels' Chattering), and IV.B.5
(Bats' Wings).
204. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
205. See Red Squirrel, supra note 197, at 171 n.37.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
207. See Red Squirrel, supra note 197, at 170;, see also David M. Trubek & William J. Gillen, Environ-
mental Defense II. Examining the Limits of Interest Group Advocaty, in PUBLIC INTEREsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC
AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (B. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978).
208. See supra part IV.B.5.
209. RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, at § 4.11 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (discussing Refuse Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1988)); see also JOHN QUAu. ES, CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRON.
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ch. 6 (1976).
210. See Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975),followed in Zieske v. Butz, 406
F. Supp. 258 (D. Alaska 1975), superseded by the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. § 1600 (1988).
211. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973).
212. E. Donald Elliott et al., TowardA Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmen-
tal Law, 1 J. L., ECON. & ORGANIZAnON 313 (1985); see also William Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331 (1991) (for another excellent evolutionary model).
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how a credit-claiming competition among Presidential aspirants (in this case, Rich-
ard Nixon and Edmund Muskie) could produce a Clean Air Act of 1970 that was
considerably tougher than either one would have preferred. Like any good model,
the E-A-M account offers a plausible psychology for the principal players (compe-
tition among leaders, vote-seeking, credit-claiming, protection of sunk costs in po-
litical capital, risk-taking by aspirants for higher office), and it explains outcomes
that are hard to account for. For example, how could a "tough" environmental law
be enacted before the appearance of well-organized pressure groups demanding it?
The article borrows, and gives content to, several concepts familiar to the world of
evolutionary biology, including historical constraint, selection, coevolution, 213
adaptation (e.g., the pursuit of federal preemption strategies by industries as second-
best alternatives to no regulation), and even predation (e.g., political cost-external-
ization, defined as achieving a benefit for constituents at somebody else's ex-
pense).214
The E-A-M model displays legal versions of the maladaptations associated with
peacocks' tails (multiple-goal decisions), pandas' thumbs (historical constraints),
and cats' tails (obsolescence by history). The dynamics of the decisionmaking
pulled both contestants towards the endorsement of a statute that was less than the
optimum from their points of view:
Muskie wrote a 'tough' pollution statute in 1970, one which ran a serious risk
of alienating industry, only when he was threatened with an outcome which
was even worse from his perspective-the loss of his reputation with the public
as a crusader to clean up the environment; Nixon went along, reluctantly, be-
cause the adverse political consequences of vetoing the bill were perceived as
greater than those of signing it.215
The E-A-M model proceeds through six stages (common law ascendancy, po-
litical cost-externalization, pre-emptive federalization, aspirational lawmaking, le-
galistic bureaucracy, statutory revisionism) that offer an approximate description
of how the major environmental laws have changed over time.216 The most inter-
esting feature of the model is how each stage is depicted as the "natural outgrowth"
of the preceding stage and how the institutional structure at each point in time
carries within it "the seeds of its own destruction."217 This is a fascinating world
of historical constraint (pandas' thumbs) and gradual obsolescence (cats' tails),
213. Technically, the term coevolution describes "the reciprocal evolutionary changes that occur
when unrelated species influence changes in each other." MILNER supm note 14, at 86 (adopting defini-
tion of population biologists Paul R. Ehrlich and Peter H. Raven).
214. Elliott et al., supra note 212, at 326, 329.
215. Id at 338.
216. Id. at 315.
217. Compare id at 318 wibt id at 315.
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where strategic choices in Time One rise up repeatedly to bite their sponsors in
Time Two. Thus, those who succeed in imposing the costs on out-of-staters inad-
vertently set the stage for a retaliatory preemption; those who bring on preemption
create the very statutory vehicle that later can be turned against them; and those
who prevail by confining the statute to aspirational utterance have set the stage for
the implementing details that may appear in the next round of amendments. The
dynamic approach of the E-A-M model shows convincingly how the best strategy
for a player in Time One is likely to be less than the best in a more extended time
horizon.
By depicting a six-staged progression from common law ascendancy to statu-
tory maturity, the E-A-M model raises a question important in any evolutionary
system-namely, whether the process proceeds in a particular direction or towards a
recognizable goal. The idea of orthogenesis endorses the position that evolution
follows some pre-ordained path.218 This perspective has succumbed in modern evo-
lutionary biology to the view that evolution proceeds in more "opportunistic" and
haphazard directions.2 19 Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian show clearly that statutes
are not written on a blank slate at each sitting and that laws cannot be expected to
drift at random without regard to their historical baggage. However, the dominant
message is a precautionary one-of haphazard drift and change within broad con-
tours.220 The big statute, like the big case, will tend to take on a life of its own and
defeat even the best-informed predictions across the expanse of time.
3. Drift, Selection, and Incrementalism
The Krier-Ursin book-length study 221 of the evolution of thirty-five years of
air pollution control policy in the Los Angeles basin offers no formal model of
change but is presented rather as a "case essay," or historical narrative, 222 which is
the same terminology often used to describe evolutionary biology. Like the E-A-M
model, the Krier-Ursin book builds on the convincing descriptions of the behavior
and motivations of real-life people-turf protectors, short-term thinkers, opportunis-
tic exploiters of uncertainty. The reader is given examples of the use of law as ex-
218. MILNER, supra note 14, at 345 (defining orthogenesis as "meaning an origin that is spelled out
from the beginning ....").
219. Id., quoting George Gaylord Simpson, whose books include TEMPO AND MODE IN EVOLUTION
(1944) and THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION (1949).
220. Compare RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, at vii-viii with 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW. HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES vii (1992) (environmental laws appear to follow a path
of increasing complexity, fissioning, specialization, and eventual extinction). See generally JOHN T. BON-
NER, THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (1988).
221. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLic: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977).
222. Compare id at 3 with id at 10 (format allows discussion that is "tentative, speculative, impres-
sionistic").
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cuse and contrivance,223 passionate self-preservation (control the visible pollutants
before the invisible ones), 2 4 and enthusiastic scapegoating-wartime pollution epi-
sodes were deemed to be Japanese "gas" attacks or the perverse product of a rogue
synthetic rubber plant.225 Krier and Ursin do an especially valuable service by in-
troducing human emotion-in the form of a response to air pollution episodes and
crises-as an important lubricant of public policy. According to Krier and Ursin,
the periodic crisis or incident can be viewed as an opinion-coalescing substitute for
overt leadership,2 26 and it can produce the anger that brings citizen groups togeth-
er,227 surges in moral rectitude that can move an otherwise passive population to
action,228 constituent dissatisfaction that can be exploited by ambitious policy
makers,229 and citizen receptivity to media information blitzes (e.g., the "Breath of
Death" radio series) that can sustain short campaigns of political activism. 230
While the Krier-Ursin book on policy evolution does not draw formally on the
descriptive terminology of evolutionary biology, the parallels are strong and uncan-
ny. The book makes reference to what could be called borrowed laws or start-up
laws,231 which can prove to be especially influential because they are exploiting un-
filled niches. The parallels in evolutionary biology are the founder principle (new
populations based on a small sample will carry only a subset of the genes of the
parental stock) and genetic drift (a chance element in evolution especially impor-
tant in small populations where traits can rise or fall in frequency independently
of advantages or disadvantages they may impart to organisms).232 One of the cen-
tral themes of the Krier-Ursin study is the so-called "lag" in political and legal re-
sponse, described as the "presumably unwarranted delay between a problem's
recognition and its resolution."2 33 This "lag" is another indicator of the cats'
tail 234 because yesterday's policy is frozen in time and unable to meet the needs of
223. See id at 256-57.
224. See iii at 74-75.
225. See id at 52-54.
226. See id at 263-77. "The role of 'incidents' can thus be seen as a coordinating role; it is a sub-
stitute for overt leadership and communication .... ." Id at 271-72 (quoting Thomas Schelling).
227. Id at 272.
228. Id at 270-71. "Crises may give rise to a sense of duty, a sense of need to do one's part, not so
much as to abate the crisis as to satisfy the urgings of a conscience untroubled in more mundane times."
lId at 271. See ,eneralo Martha L Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
37 (1988)X Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justic" Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CoR-
NELL L RE. 655 (1989).
229. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 221, at 275-76.
230. Id at 274.
231., i at 56 (early air pollution ordinances in Southern California borrowed from eastern cities
with mostly stationary-source sulfur problems). For an example of a founder law with extraordinary
staying power, see 3 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES
§§ 5.20, 5.30 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (influences of the Insecticide Act of 1910 are still detectable in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act). Laws transported across cultural boundaries also
might have unpredictable effects once loosed from the constraining influences of their native environ-
ments.
232. See LURIA ET AL., supr note 71, at 768-69 (glossary definitions of the founder principle and
genetic drift), elaborated in iU at 590-92.
233. KRsER & URIN, supra note 221, at 295.
234. See supra part IV.B.4.
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tomorrow's environment.
Krier and Ursin introduce the notion of "exfoliation," which can be defined
as a process of experimental refutation of policy options. 235 As described by the
authors, this mechanism looks very much like a Darwinian version of artificial se-
lection:
As measures were tried, and as they failed in whole or in part, layer upon
layer of obscurity about the pollution problem was stripped away. The failure
of each 'solution' produced valuable information about where to look and
what to do (or at least where not to look and what not to do) next. This
process had much to do with discovering, and especially with showing con-
clusively, that motor vehicles are an important contributor to modern air pol-
lution; it also largely explains the movement of control authority from local
to state to federal government.
236
... The exfoliation process provided one means by which policy tended to
make its own best case against prevailing conceptions of what policy should
be about. And it made cases convincingly, putting matters beyond the reach
of bickering scientists and the claims of vested interests that their responsi-
bility had not been established. Like crises, but in much less dramatic fash-
ion, exfoliation helped overcome the burdens of proof and inertia in ways
that the finest pieces of research could not. Like crises, it became both the
curse and the redeemer of policy that was, sometimes for understandable rea-
sons but often for foolish ones, shortsighted.237
The Krier-Ursin book contains a number of observations on the nature and
rates of evolutionary change that have direct parallels in evolutionary biology. On
the one hand, the emphasis on crisis, and periodic fixes, gives the policy process a
sporadic and episodic cast suggestive of the biological theory of punctuated equi-
librium,238 which is that evolution proceeds by long periods of stasis "punctuated"
by episodes of rapid change. On the other hand, Krier and Ursin identify a theme
of incrementalism, called a policy-by-least-steps, which proceeds by disturbing the
existing situation "as little as possible."239 Classical Darwinism is strongly associ-
ated with this kind of incrementalism or gradualism where modification occurs
235. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 221, at 12.
236. Id
237. Id at 293.
238. See MILNERt, supra note 14, at 375 (discussing the theory of Stephen Jay Gould and Niles El-
dredge). Compare NILES ELDREDGE, UNFINISHED SYNTHESIS: BIoIxxicAL HIERARCHIES AND MODERN Evo.
LUTIONARY THOUGHT (1985) (by one of the discoverers of punctuated equilibria) with DAWKiNS, supra'note
19, at ch. 9 (for a strong criticism of punctuated equilibrium) and id at ch. 3.
239. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 221, at 252; ef id at 11:
The history is far more one of reaction than initiative: events, not foresight, ush-
ered in each stage of intervention. Intervention tended to consist in curative
rather than preventive measures, and was designed to preserve so far as possible
the prevailing social patterns ....
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through a progression of small changes.240 In all likelihood, one suspects, legal
and biological evolution alike eventually will be acknowledged as combining ele-
ments of sporadic and incremental change.
The Krier-Ursin study confirms repeatedly the constraints of history made
manifest by the E-A-M model2 41 and underscores the nonlinear responses for
which biological systems are justly famous.242 The best example of the latter phe-
nomenon is the political brinkmanship associated with attempts to develop a trans-
portation control plan for the Los Angeles area in the early 1970s. 243 A child of
crisis, this plan went through a number of extraordinary iterations, including pro-
posals to cut off gasoline entirely for the use of private autos,244 and it gave rise to
political predictions of armed attacks on gasoline stations.245 Needless to say, so-
cial upheavals of this sort are likely to effect sudden changes in law and policy.
246
B. Exploring the Plasticity of Human Behavior: Towards the Pursuit of Effective Law
Adaptation is the process by which organic design and behavior is brought
into close compatibility with the physical environment. Adaptation is marked by
the sensitive adjustment to environmental demands, while maladaptation is a con-
dition of being poorly designed or prepared to achieve needed behavioral expecta-
tions. This Section will briefly identify artifacts and laws that anticipate
implausible or heroic human responses; the consequence is that the respondents
are maladapted to these technological or legal environments. These varieties of
maladaptations are characterized by reference to the five-fold Panda's thumb typol-
ogies developed above.247 Using examples drawn from the pesticides and oil pol-
lution laws, the article recommends the development of"compliancegrams," which
are descriptions of the repertoires of human behaviors that must coincide in order
to achieve the stated objectives of any law.
240. MILNER, supra note 14, at 199; cf TIGER, supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
Romer's rule of incremental change in biology).
241. Compare KFjER & URSIN, supra note 221, at 4 ("the past has indeed been prologue in many im-
portant respects . . . .") with id ("large portions of the contemporary scheme of [air pollution] control
are the legacy of those early years ...
242. Compare Susan Okie, Lake Bouniy Becomes Its Bane Transplanted Fish Help Speed Ecological De-
raise of Africa's [Lake] Victoria, WASH. PosT, July 7, 1992, at Al with MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK
(1990), a bestseller that makes the point with convincing clarity.
243. See generaly KRIER & URSIN, supra note 221, at ch. 13.
244. Id at 224.
245. Id at 222.
246. See MILNER, supra note 14, at 76 (catastrophism in geology contrasted with Charles Lyell's doc-
trine of uniformitarianism-a geological version of the equilibrium/gradualism debate that occurs in
evolutionary biology).
247. On the constraining and liberating functions of law, see Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Sense of Jus-
tice and the Concept of Cultural Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUsTCE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 106
(Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992).
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1. The Recognition of Maladaptation
The human ability to create novel environments with rapidity and efficiency
is a fertile source of maladaptation in response. Upton Sinclair's description of the
slaughterhouse in TheJungle could be called an abominable example of the Chinese-
menu or the peacock's tail where the "good" factory comes equipped with some
unfortunate "bads" for the human users:
Some worked at the stamping-machines, and it was very seldom that one
could work long there at the pace that was set, and not give out and forget
himself, and have a part of his hand chopped off. There were the 'hoisters,'
as they were called, whose task it was to press the lever which lifted the dead
cattle off the floor. They ran along upon a rafter, peering down through the
damp and the steam; and as old Durham's architects had not built the killing-
room for the convenience of the hoisters, at every few feet they would have
to stoop under a beam, say four feet above the one they ran on; which got
them into the habit of stooping, so that in a few years they would be walking
like chimpanzees. Worst of any, however, were the fertilizer-men, and those
who served in the cooking-rooms. These people could not be shown to the
visitor,-for the odor of a fertilizer-man would scare any ordinary visitor at a
hundred yards, and as for the other men, who worked in tank-rooms full of
steam, and in some of which there were open vats near the level of the floor,
their peculiar trouble was that they fell into the vats; and when they were
fished out, there was never enough of them left to be worth exhibiting,-some-
times they would be overlooked for days, till all but the bones of them had
gone out to the world as Durham's Pure Leaf Lard.248
A similar theme of poor fit between inhabitant and environment appears in the
instant classic by cognitive scientist Donald A. Norman, The Psychology of Eveiyday
Things,249 which explores those many human creations with knobs and dials, lights
and meters, and controls and switches that ignore the user's basic behavioral needs
"of visibility, appropriate clues, and feedback of one's actions." 250 The peacock's
tail is especially prominent in the Norman book because aesthetics frequently
trump function in the design of everyday products and common architecture. The
book thus is filled with examples of product designs that defy the patterning hab-
248. UP'rON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 117 (1906), quoted in RICHARD NISBETr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN IN-
FERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 44 (1980) (on the disproportionate in-
fluence of "vivid, concrete, and absorbing writing.").
249. DONALD A. NORMANLTHE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1988). Seegeneralo Richard J.
Hornick, Dreams-Design and Desuny, 29 HUM. FACTORS 111 (1987); HENRY PETROSKI, To ENGINEER Is HU-
MAN: THE ROLE OF FAILURE IN SUCCESSFUL DESIGN (1985); IAN L. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (Dou-
bleday Paperback 1971) (1969). The study of the interface between product design and human user is
called ergonomics. It is increasingly important in tort law.
250. NORMAN, suepra note 249, at 8-9.
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its, biases, and routines of the human brain: confusing instrument panels, inscru-
table stovetops, confounding arrangements of levers and dials, problematic
configurations of handles and wheels, auto horns hidden where the windshield
wipers should be, doors designed to trap and frustrate rather than liberate. The
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island was attributable to operator "naivete." Spe-
cifically, the operators trusted a light on the control panel to indicate that a valve
meant to hold cooling water in the reactor core was closed. 251 The accident at Cher-
nobyl began as a "well-intentioned attempt" to test the safety features of the plant
and drifted through a series of "logical and sensible" choices to the ultimate infer-
no.
252
2. Maladaptation in Law: The Pesticides Example of "Careful Use"
These lessons of the poor fits between machinery and worker or product and
user are repeated in the design of laws. Behavior need not follow law, and law need
not lead behavior. Indeed, some very sophisticated legal systems rest upon fiction-
al, mythological, and erroneous assumptions about human behavior.
To illustrate with but one among many examples, the central premise of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 253 is the concept of
"careful use," which depends upon poisons being applied to the environment con-
sistently with the product labeling administratively approved.254 This legal system
is reliant, in turn, upon vigorous inquiry by investigators into the effects of releases,
successful translation by label-writers into instructions for use, efficient transmis-
sion of instructions by sellers and managers to those who would apply the product,
attentive study of labels by the applicators, and studious attention to operational
detail by the folks who apply the poisons. This concatenation of improbables de-
fies not only the laws of biology and psychology (e.g., the reading of English labels
by those literate in some other language, implausible contortions by duster-plane
pilots, deep reflection by harried spray operators), but occasionally the laws of
physics (e.g., by expecting performances contrary to the rules of atmospheric chem-
istry or of the drift of small particles).255 Not unexpectedly, empirical studies con-
firm that the improbable behavioral expectations of the pesticides laws do not in
fact happen, with a resulting pattern of product misapplication, damage, and dis-
251. See id at 43-44.
252. Compare idi at 128 with VICTOR HAYNEs & MARKO BOJCUN, THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER ch. 1
(1988) (discussing six violations of plant safety rules, occasioned by operator motivations of conve-
nience, over-confidence, chance-taking to control a situation getting out of hand, and ultimate panic).
253. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
254. Compare RODGERS, JR., supra note 231, §§ 5.2, 5.12, with id § 5.11 (classification of pesticides),
§§ 5.18 to 5.20 (registration cancellations and suspensions) and § 5.12 at 166-67 (discussing use incon-
sistent with labeling).
255. Compare id § 5.12 at 170 n.78 (label says that product should be applied "at speeds not to
exceed 6 miles per hour" when 10 miles per hour is the minimum speed necessary to keep the air-
craft aloft) with § 5.25 at 328-29 (collecting cases of inevitable drift damage).
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tress.
256
FIFRA could serve as an excellent vehicle for the study of legal maladaptation.
It offers examples of awkward linkages (Chinese-menus), suboptimal compromises
(peacocks' tails), historical distortions (panda's thumbs), time-lag maladaptations
(cats' tails), and opportunistic preadaptations (bats' wings). FIFRA also could be
construed as containing some Type VI maladaptations peculiar to law and not ob-
served in nature-features contrived to be dysfunctional and deliberately built not
to work.
To make matters worse, the world of pesticide applications does not appear to
be strongly constrained by the civilizing influences of kinship, reciprocity, reputa-
tion, or commitment familiar to the biological theories of altruism. With some
exceptions, the prototypical FIFRA transaction is a nonreciprocal spraying episode
creating risks to others (often nonhumans) that are distant in place and time. Spar-
ing these victims anticipates a version of capital-A Altruism that is unlikely to be-
come firmly established.
3. Rooting Out Maladaptation: Adornment and Function in Law-The
Oil Spill Example
One is tempted to condemn without further inquiry false behavioral assump-
tions whenever they appear in law. Delusions of compliance are an unlikely ingre-
dient of an effective rule of law.257 To gain further enlightenment on this subject,
though, we will examine the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,258 which became law on
August 18th of that year. The 1990 Act marked the initial Congressional response
to the Exxon Valdez oil spill of March 1989. In an approximate way, the Exxon
Valdez accident was the product of a combination of failures that included erratic
navigation by an incapacitated captain in a vulnerable vessel under poorly planned
256. See, e.g., ROBERT G. TARDIFF, METHODS TO ASSESS ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PESTICIDES ON NON-TAR-
GET ORGANISMS (1992) (Publication 49 of the International Scientific Committee on Problems of the
Environment) (99% of pesticides applied do not reach their targets); COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND REG-
ULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE USE PATTERNS AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION, BOARD ON AGRI.
CULTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX 4-7
(1987) (60% by weight of all herbicides, and 90% of all fungicides applied are considered oncogenic or
potentially oncogenic; these oncogens appear in hundreds of processed foods, some of which have tol-
erances and some of which do not); WORLD COMM'N ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 126 (1987) (pesticides account for 10,000 deaths annually in developing countries worldwide;
400,000 cases of acute suffering); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, BENEATH THE BOTTOM LINE: AGRICUL.
TURAL APPROACHES TO REDUCE AGRICHEMICAL CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER 3 (1990) (forty-six pes-
ticides found in groundwater in 26 states; not clear whether the cause was "chronic mismanagement"
or the result of "normal, label-specified field use"); see also RODGERS, JR., smpra note 231, § 5.12 at 160
n.18 (collecting empirical studies of poor labeling and noncompliance); W. KIP ViSCUSl & WESLEY A.
MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION (1987);
W. Kip Viscusi, Psrdicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
283 (1988).
257. MARGARET GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 21 (1991).
"The effectiveness of law will be proportional to the degree to which the function of a particular law
complements the function of the behavior that the law intends to regulate." M, (emphasis omitted).
258. Pub. L No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (amending several statutes); see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, § 4.37A (Supp. 1992).
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conditions.25 9  In a long (ninety-one pages), comprehensive (amendments were
made to nine different statutes), and detailed response, Congress spread solutions
across this spectrum of navigation, operations, vessel condition, and planning.260
Behind the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are a wide variety of human behavioral as-
sumptions about bad-weather observations, upstart second-officers, clever program-
mers, casual use of the auto-pilot, aggressive engineers, and careful planners. But it
is the specter of the drunken captain, personified as Joseph Hazelwood, that drove
this legislative engine. Our discussion will be limited to the legalized mutiny and
the planning provisions. The central question is whether these measures represent
effective law.
a. Legalized Mutiny and the Myth of Compliance
Section 4104261 of the 1990 Act tackles the problem of the drunken captain by
obliging the second-in-command to take over the vessel temporarily "when the
[two] next most senior licensed officers on a vessel reasonably believe that the mas-
ter or individual in charge of the vessel is under the influence of alcohol or a dan-
gerous drug and is incapable of commanding the vessel." Assuming for the
moment that this law is meant to serve a functional and not merely an aesthetic
purpose, namely, the elimination of the risk of accident due to captain drunken-
ness, can we say anything useful about the effectiveness of this law as adjudged from
a behavioral perspective? Borrowing from ethology, we will attempt to construct
for this law a compliancegram, 262 which can be defined as a description of the
range and probability of behaviors that must coincide in order to achieve the pro-
fessed objective of the law. So viewed, this legalized mutiny can be expected to hap-
pen if one of the junior officers knows of the law (K), recognizes the risk (R),
overcomes (0) his hesitation to initiate a takeover, persuades (P) his colleague to
join in the endeavor, and defeats (D) other practical barriers to the takeover.
259. See authorities collected in RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, § 4.37A (Supp. 1992); Robert W Adler
& Charles Lord, Envimnmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781, 782 (1991); Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Essay, A Modern Political Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 11 PuB. LAND L REv. 1, 7
n.12 (1990):
The findings of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission make clear that whatever the
captain's shortcomings, the Exxon Valdez oil spill was an accident that was bound
to happen: the combination of regulatory and corporate complacency, crew
fatigue, insufficient personnel, insufficient radar, and insufficiently rigorous load-
ing practices, as well as insufficient response preparations, created the precondi-
tions for predictable spill disasters in the oil transport system.
(citing ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ, IMPLICATIONS FOR
SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF OIL iv (1990)).
260. Russel V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Inten4 and Effects, 21 ENVTL L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,119 (1991).
261. 104 Stat. at 511 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 8101 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
262. Compare CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 88, at 104 (ethogram refers to at-
tempts to draw up "a complete behavioral inventory for a particular species") with KONRAD LORENZ,
HERE AM 1-WHERE ARE You? THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GREYLAG GOOSE (Robert D. Martin trans., 1991)
and Niko Tinbergen, On War and Peace in Animals and Man, 160 Sc. 1411 (1968) and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HuMAN EVOLLION AND PREHISTORY, supra note 22, at 184.
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What are the probabilities that all conditions (K, R, 0, P, D) will be satisfied
to bring the vessel under safe command? Knowledge (K) of the law is usually as-
sumed for legal purposes, and for good reason since the assumption is unlikely to
be established as an empirical matter. One is left to speculation as to whether and
how junior officers will be advised of their mutiny rights. The option to take over
the vessel may well be spelled out in various directives, commands, manuals, and
rules known best by the novitiates and least by the veterans. The possibility may
be mentioned (featured?) in a mandatory (optional?) meeting on compliance with
the oil spill rules. Each officer might be given the full text (all 91 pages?) of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which makes it a theoretical possibility that Section 4104
could be read and understood by at least a tiny fraction of the licensed merchant
mariners. One suspects that years of education would be necessary to elevate the
mutiny-option rule to the status of plausible hypothesis among working junior of-
ficers. There is no ship's lawyer, and if there were, he would be working for the
captain. There is no report either of any captain posting a notice on a bulkhead
spelling out the "Mutiny Option." A conservative estimate of the probability of
the (K) requirement being satisfied is 1:5.
Risk recognition (R) is not a serious barrier to compliance, but a knowledge
of human behavior could help in the analysis. Surely the mate can recognize a
drunken captain when he sees one (and avoid the risk of confusing inebriation
with, say, a stroke) although the use of "drugs" other than alcohol might give rise
to odd behavior creating some ambiguities in interpretation. 263 The big problem
with risk recognition (R) is in appreciating that the drunken captain is "incapable"
of commanding the vessel. The situation is bound to be ambiguous (the captain
might be only slightly drunk, or indisposed to interfere, or soon to be so drunk
that he can't interfere, or waters could be calm, or the automatic-pilot dependable,
etc.), and ambiguity can be resolved as non-threatening in the mind of a junior of-
ficer. There is evidence also that self-deception may be at work to convince both
the captain and the junior officers that the risks are non-emergent.2 64 We will as-
sign a probability of 1:2 that a junior officer will recognize (R) the captain-drunk-
enness risk when it appears on the scene.
Having recognized the risk, will the mate overcome (0) hesitation to put in
motion the machinery of this legalized mutiny? Even with personal safety at stake,
the behavioral constraints against this sort of challenge to authority are formidable.
Within primate bands the very idea of a "temporary" takeover of leadership is im-
plausible because of small rewards and high risks of subsequent retaliation. 265 So-
263. See TERENCE MCKENNA, FOOD OF THE GODS: THE SEARCH FOR ThE ORIGINAL TREE OF KNOWL.
EDGE-A RADICAL HISTORY OF PLANTS, DRUGS, AND HUMAN EVOLUION (1992).
264. See Robert Trivers & Huey P. Newton, The Crash of Flight 90: Doomed By SelfDeception? Scl.
DIG., Nov. 1982, at 66.
265. On the tensions and violence of coalition break-ups among chimpanzees, see DE WAA, supra
note 15, at 57-74.
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ciological studies of modern bureaucracies underscore the difficulties of
encouraging communication contrary to established norms,266 much less direct
challenges to the authority of the leadership. In the maritime world, of course,
centuries of tradition have accorded the captain a role of unquestioned authori-
ty,2 67 and those in the business are entirely familiar with the career-threatening con-
sequences of challenging these traditions. Junior officers who will rock this boat
will be made of stern and unusual stuff. We will fix the probabilities of 0 being
satisfied as 1:12.
Having convinced himself, will junior officer A be able to persuade (P) junior
officer B to go along with the takeover? There are a number of variables here we
can not account for: is this a case of a subordinate attempting to persuade a supe-
rior, or a superior a subordinate? Are the junior officers friends or rivals? Or long-
term acquaintances or relative strangers? Was the decision to take over the vessel
jointly arrived at, or did one overcome hesitation and make a commitment to ac-
tion before seeking to persuade the other? The severity of the emergency obviously
will influence the resolution of K and P by both actors. With this said, the second
officer, like the first, will be contemplating a course of action under highly ambig-
uous and stressful conditions that will be of some considerable risk to her career.
Even with the support of a colleague, the probability of the P barrier being over-
come is not high -1:10 is the choice.
Even with the juniors committed to overthrowing the captain's authority, we
must add a factor (D) to account for other miscellaneous obstacles that might stand
in the way of a successful shift of power. What if the captain resists, and resists
with force? Will the crew cooperate? Systems of formal approval (e.g., radio com-
munication) might be superimposed on the process to constrain the choices other-
wise open to the junior officers. Or what if the ship's doctor announces an
interpretation of "under the influence" that deviates from the conclusion of the
juniors? Or the turmoil of the moment may lend itself to a "nobody in charge"
solution where the junior officers can take some steps to combat the pollution risk
while protecting themselves from the career risks that might attend a complete take-
266. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRES.
IDENT chs. 4-5, 95-96, 99, 101, 107 (1986) (the contractors (Morton Thiokol) recommended against the
launch because of concerns regarding 0-ring temperatures, ran into opposition from middle-level NASA
managers and Morton Thiokol's superiors (one key person was told to "take off his engineering hat and
put on his management hat,") took another "perspective" under this pressure, identified an "ambiguity"
in the data, and caved in by withdrawing the no-launch recommendation; NASA upper-level manage-
ment responsible for the launch were never informed about the safety concerns or the engineers' oppo-
sition). Compare HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989) with Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administra-
tive Incentives, and the New Clean AirAd, 21 ENvTL L 1647 (1991) (for an excellent compilation of"laws"
of agency misbehavior).
267. Cf NOEL MOSTERT, SUPER SHIP 122 (1975) (rise of the oil tanker presages a day when "the tra-
ditional supreme authority and overlordship of the captain was ... over. One British company ...
already had dropped the title of captain and was calling the ship's master 'manager,' while the ship itself
was being run by a 'committee,' consisting of navigation, engineering, and electrical officers"). It might
be easier to overthrow a "manager" than a "captain."
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
over. These D obstacles will be assigned a probability of 1:2 of preventing the shift
in command envisaged by the law.
There is little in the altruism theory summarized above268 that would revise
our probability estimates. Making a career-threatening move against the captain
would appear to be a repudiation of reciprocity rather than a confirmation of it.
Concern about reputation in the profession would work to discourage the mutiny,
not bring it about. Undoubtedly there are officers who instinctively will rush to
do the right thing, and thus satisfy Frank's commitment model, but this law re-
quires a combination of two heroes, not the erratic intervention of only one.
Our compliancegram for the legalized mutiny rule tells us, then, that a limited
knowledge of the law compounded with difficulties of recognizing the risk and of
conforming to the legal mandates will lead to a low rate of compliance. The com-
bined probabilities of K (1:5), R (1:2), 0 (1:12), P (1:10), and D (1:2) amount to
1:2400. Put another way, this law can be expected to repair one of every 2,400
drunken-captain, oil-spill-risk enhancements. This is not an effective law. A legis-
lator might vote for the measure on symbolic grounds or because it does not hurt
but not because it materially reduces the risks of oil spills from the navigation of
tankers.
b. Planning and the Attrition of Time
Oil spill contingency plans have been a primary exhibit in the law of water
pollution since the 1960s, 269 and the concept received a thorough empirical test in
the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster:
The fishermen of Prince William Sound watched in the hours after the wreck
on Bligh Reef as eleven million gallons poured out into their waters. On
Friday morning, some of them hired a small airplane to fly out from Cor-
dova to survey the wreck. "It was eerie," said Riki Ott. "On the radio, the
whole world was talking about the disaster. People in the lower forty-eight
were busily planning volunteer cleanup and animal rescue units to support
the official response forces, but here in Prince William Sound lay the Exxon
Valdez completely quiet, surrounded by a pool of oil a mile across, with blue
fog vapors rising from it, just a few people standing on the deck, shaking
their heads, looking at this catastrophe, and no one out there doing anything on
the water." That morning, nine hours after the spill, the fishermen could fly
around the oil slick in only eight minutes. And they waited, watching, ex-
pecting the official governmental and corporate mechanisms to jump into
268. See supra part III.B.
269. For origins of the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), see RODGERS, JR., supra note 220,
§ 8.6; see also Joseph Freedman, Proposed Amendments to the National Contingeny
Plan: Explanation andAnalysis, 19 ENvL. L REp. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,103, 10,105 (1989) (first ver-
sion of the NCP was issued in September of 1968).
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action, as so often promised in contingency plans, political representations,
and courtroom proceedings. For almost forty hours the weather of Prince
William Sound was uncharacteristically generous. The normal winds of
March were nowhere to be seen; the seas were calm and the oil stayed in a
compact floating mass near the Exxon Valdez. But no one showed up with
the necessary skimming barges, the containment booms, the storage materials
and clean-up equipment so confidently promised earlier. And then at the
end of the second day, the winds came back with a vengeance. One fisher-
man looked up from Valdez Sunday afternoon and saw a ribbon of snow
blowing off the shoulder of one of the mountain peaks. "Uh-oh," he said,
.there it goes," and within 24 hours the oil had blown forty miles southeast-
ward, out of control forevermore, as the official players still continued to try
to figure out what to do.
270
The reasons for this contingency nonresponse are not much in doubt:27 1 confu-
sion of authority (all looked to Alyeska), lack of preparedness (Exxon took over
command of the response operation within twenty-four hours but was untrained
for the job), staff limitations (supervision of all operations at the Valdez terminal
was assigned to one-half the time of one full-time Alaska Department of Environ-
mental Conservation field person), shortages of equipment (skimming barges, con-
tainment booms), lack of expertise (not enough people to operate the equipment,
interpret the tides, etc.). It is another question, of course, and not a trivial one, to
ask whether any response would have sufficed to contain the 10.8 million gallons
of crude oil that found its way into the waters of Prince William Sound on March
22, 1989.
How did Congress respond to this demonstrated failure of contingency plan-
ning? By adding to the Act "an extremely elaborate system of contingency plan-
ning, consisting of a national response unit ("NRU"), Coast Guard strike teams,
Coast Guard district response groups, area committees, area contingency plans, and
individual vessel and facility response plans." 272 The facility and vessel response
plans, which have their own histories going back to 1973,273 must be written to
combat a "worst case discharge"274 and are expected to cover topics such as training,
equipment testing, unannounced drills, and planned responses. 275 They are sup-
posed to dovetail in unspecified ways with similar legal requirements under the
270. Plater, supra note 259, at 1-9.
271. Id at 8-9 & nn.16-17; see also Randle, supra note 260, at 10,128 (citing the National Response
Team Report).
272. Randle, supra note 260, at 10,128.
273. RODGERS, JRL, supra note 156, § 4.36 at 530.
274. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4XC) (Supp. IV 1992).
275. See id (area contingency plan must "be adequate to remove a worst case discharge" and describe
"in detail" the responsibilities of the owner or operator and the several agencies and how the several
different plans are integrated). On the definition of "worst case discharge," see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(24)
(Supp. IV 1992).
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Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act.
276
For this law too, we will develop a compliancegram to explore whether this
legal mandate is likely to bring forth contingency plans adequate to the task of in-
terdicting future Exxon Valdez disasters. This discussion will be directed chiefly to
the area and the individual vessel and facility plans. To achieve the objective, it is
necessary for a large number of people to cooperate by writing a plan (W), updating
and refining it to assure its adequacy (A), communicating (C) knowledge of the
plan throughout a number of groups, following (F) the plan when the crisis strikes,
and confirming after-the-fact that the plan is sufficient (S) when followed. Not sur-
prisingly, the prospects of simultaneous satisfaction of conditions (W, A, C, F, S)
appear to be vanishingly thin.
No creature on earth makes a habit of remote contingency planning, and one
must suspect at the outset that humans, too, are indisposed to devote great energies
to the contemplation of conditions that might not happen. Nonetheless, insofar
as the writing (W) of plans is concerned, two decades of legal insistence and no
little accumulation of business experience has been devoted to the development of
these contingency documents. After all, a "plan," albeit not a very good one, was
in place for the Exxon Valdez disaster. The 1990 Act will direct still greater resourc-
es towards preparing "plans" of this sort.277 Our prediction, then, is that for the
next disaster the probabilities of a "plan" being in place are 1:2.
The adequacy (A) of this plan, especially over time, is another matter. Plan-
writers typically are divorced from conditions in the field and are free to speculate
about any number of conditions and behaviors that are unlikely to happen.278 Re-
hearsals tend to be happy-go-lucky parodies that do not remotely inform about the
grim realities of the real event.279 With paper products rarely or never put to the
test, there is no selection for stupidity or implausibility.280 And even if a hypothet-
ically perfect plan. could be written, it would soon be out of date, in the flux of
equipment, personnel, and organizational changes. A number of behavioral studies
276. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 258, at 151.
277. Thompson Publishing Group, Brochure announcing The Oil Spill Planning Manual, Aug.,
1992 (charter price of $548.00, with a $50.00 discount; four quarterly updates) (Coast Guard estimates
that $20,000 - $70,000 is required per facility to develop response plan; operations must shut down if
plan not submitted by Feb. 18, 1993); 57 Fed. Reg. 27514 (1992) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155)
(proposed June 19, 1992) (Coast Guard proposed rules on Vessel Response Plans).
278. See William H. Rodgers, Nerve Gas to the Northwest and Beyond, I ENvTL. LEIES 111 (1971)
(nerve gas evacuation plans assume orderly withdrawal by drivers using highways).
279. Have you seen the film of the Boeing employees happily and efficiently evacuating the aircraft
by sliding down the giant inflatable slide? I would like to see the same test run on a fully loaded flight
I took with a high school band equipped with drums, tubas, and trombones encumbering the aisles.
Predicted time of an "emergency" evacuation in this setting: 45 minutes.
280. For a skeptical evaluation of the work of the Federal Emergency Management Administration
("FEMA") during the Times Beach, Missouri, pollution episode, see ANNE M. BURFORD WITH JOHN
GREENYA, ARE You TOUGH ENOUGH? AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF WASHINGTON POWER POLmCS 187-204
(1986). FEMA is the agency that writes the plans that tell us what to do in the event of a nuclear attack.
It has a reputation for incorrigible incompetence. But who will ever know because the agency's work
product will be adjudged a failure only at the moment of a holocaust when retaliation will be the fur-
thest thing from anybody's mind?
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show that short-term necessity invariably trumps long-term commitment, 281 so that
if people in the organization need the barge they will take the barge although the
plan declares that it will remain on station to service any needed skimming opera-
tions.282 We fix the probabilities of an adequate (A) plan being in place at the time
of the next accident as 1:12.
Disseminating knowledge (C) of the plan presents the same sorts of difficulties
as disseminating knowledge of the legalized mutiny rule,283 except that many more
people have to be informed about many more functions. A few copies in the of-
fices of the highest managers will not suffice. It is difficult to imagine oil spill
contingency plans rising to the level of take-home reading or assuming the form
of the dog-eared manual that becomes the bible of the business. We will fix the
probability of key operatives acquiring from the plan knowledge of what they are
supposed to do at 1:10.
The prospects of the plan being followed (F) at the time of the accident are
slight by any estimate. Tomes and manuals are not consulted when the ship runs
aground. Government offices are closed at 2 A.M.; people are on vacation. Short-
term opportunism will defeat long-range deliberation. Confusion, excitement, and
fear will make a blur of any fine print. No plan influenced, much less controlled,
the response to the spill of the Exxon Valdez, and no sequel of a plan is likely to
direct in any consequential way the sequel of the spill. The probability of a gener-
alized plan adherence (F) is set at 1:10.
Our final factor of after-the-fact sufficiency (S) is included to embrace diffi-
culties beyond those anticipated by the test of before-the-fact adequacy (A).284 In
the first place, comprehensive planning, dependent as it is on the frailties of human
rationality and experience, cannot possibly anticipate all the system failures that
must be dealt with.285 This is the lesson ofJurassic Park,286 which suggests that the
trajectories of complex and nonlinear behavioral systems cannot be predicted and
therefore confined by anticipatory legal markers. Perhaps for this reason contem-
porary environmental planning often settles for a loose description of process rath-
er than a tight description of result.287 This can mean, of course, that an operator
might be able to comply with the plan (good planning, superb equipment, excellent
strategy) and yet fall short of the goal (spill containment). In the case of the Exxon
Valdez, there is little reason to believe that the best of plans, fleets of barges and
281. For an extreme example, see COUN M. TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE 33 (1972). The Ik
"are kind and generous and light-hearted and jolly when they can afford to be." Id at 295 (they "have
relinquished all luxury in the name of individual survival.").
282. Plater, supra, note 259, at 9 n.16.
283. See supra text accompanying note 266.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 243-47.
285. Set North Anna Envtl. Coalition v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 533 F.2d 655 (1976) (com-
prehensive Rasmussen study of nuclear power plant risks did not advert to the first problem presented
in litigation-construction of a facility directly astride a geological fault).
286. See CRICHTON, supra note 242.
287. See RODGERS, JR., supra note 156, § 4.21(A) (1986 & Supp. 1992) (collecting authorities).
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skimmers, coteries of experts, and armies of workers could have contained the re-
lease of 10.8 million gallons of crude oil.288 The probability of overcoming this
sufficiency problem (S) is estimated to be 1:5.
Once again, biology altruism theory28 9 holds out little hope that our proba-
bility estimates for sterling plans and prompt responses are overly pessimistic. Bu-
reaucratically-written contingency plans are an excellent example of stranger serving
stranger across expanses of space, time, contingencies, and different sympathies. It
is difficult to imagine how even a passionate reformer satisfying the Frank commit-
ment model could make a difference in this exercise. This law wishfully presumes
capital "A" Altruism among these anonymous actors not because it will happen but
because it is a necessary assumption to make the law work.
To complete the calculations, then, our compliancegram for the contingency
planning requirements advises us that even if the plans are written, they are unlike-
ly to be adequate, and if adequate they are unlikely to be implemented, and if im-
plemented they are unlikely to be successful. The combined probabilities of W
(1:2), A (1:12), C (1:10), F (1:10), and S (1:5) are 1:12,000. Rephrased, a Las Vegas
gambler would fix the odds of the next million-gallon spill being stopped by a con-
tingency plan as 12,000:1. The contingency plan requirements of the 1990 Act are
not an effective tool for stopping major spills. A legislator might vote for the mea-
sure on symbolic grounds or because it is packaged with other effective provisions
or because a plan might be helpful for dealing with small spills in confined waters.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to introduce the legal community to some ideas from
evolutionary biology that can serve, first, as a source of metaphorical instruction
for thinking about laws that change and evolve and second, as a basis for under-
standing the human behavior that the law seeks to constrain and liberate. Law-
writers should be hesitant to assume that their decrees alone can suffice to bring
about capital "A" Altruistic behavior that will be undertaken to benefit strangers
remote in time and place, and they should be clever in exploiting the cooperative
and altruistic tendencies that flow from the wellsprings of kinship, reciprocity, rep-
utation, and commitment.
Law-makers must recognize that evolution is an ongoing account of adapta-
tion but is also a story of maladaptation, replete with pandas' thumbs, cats' tails,
and bats' wings. Laws are easily written, but they can be sorely misshapen by the
288. On the effectiveness of oil spill cleanup, see ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, supra note 259, at 40
(graphic contrasting actual cleanup of spilled oil (1%) with intended contingency plan cleanup (100%)
in connection with the Exxon Valdez wreck). Compare Walter B. Parker, Foreword to id at ii with id at
2 (accident caused by departure from the tanker lanes; Coast Guard Commandant declares that "his ten-
year-old son could have steered the tanker safely through the area.").
289. See supra part IIl.B,
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duresses of time and change, and they can be misforged at the outset by ignorance
of human dispositions in thought and behavior. Effective law must be vigilant and
attentive to what people do. What people do will be influenced by what they and
their ancestors have done over thousands of years.
290
290. See GptumTE, sqpra note 257.
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